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ABSTRACT
EVALUATING ATTENTIONAL BIAS IN SHAME USING THE DOT PROBE TASK
by
Kathleen M. Grout, M.S.
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2016
Under the Supervision of Professor Shawn P. Cahill, PhD

Background: Cognitive theorists have long held that attentional biases are a central
feature of psychopathology (Beck, 1976). Although shame plays a key role in psychopathology,
research and theoretical models on information processing in shame is lacking. Objective: The
considerable overlap both functionally and topographically between shame and negative
affective states of anxiety and depression prompted our investigation in to whether there are
attentional biases in shame. Method: We compared individuals with low, moderate, and high
levels of shame on the dot probe task. We investigated the effect of valence and time course of
such biases by exposing stimuli portraying disgust, sad, and happy faces at short (150 ms),
medium (500 ms), and long (1,000 ms) durations. Results: We analyzed dot probe reaction
times along three indices: conventional bias, facilitated engagement, and difficulty disengaging.
Our analyses indicated order effects for the conventional bias index, in which the stimulus
exposure duration impacted individuals with low amounts of shame when the questionnaires
were administered first. We observed group main effects for our indices of facilitated
engagement and difficulty disengaging, in which high shame individuals exhibited slowed
engagement to all affective stimuli and delayed disengagement from all affective stimuli.
Additional trends in the data are reported. Conclusions: Implications are discussed in terms of
the perception of affect and social stimuli as threatening.
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Introduction
Guilt and Shame
Discrete emotions theory assumes that there are a set number of core emotional
responses that are expressed in similar ways universally. Although there is debate about which
emotions comprise the core emotions (theorists debate between 7-10 emotions), many theorists
propose guilt or shame as one of them (Izard, 1991; Lazarus, 1991; Lee, Scragg, & Turner,
2001). Although shame is often differentiated from guilt in discrete emotions theory, there is no
consensus on these differences and they overlap on many other key features such as facial
expressions, functions, cognitive content, and action tendencies (Tangney & Dearing, 2002;
Lazarus, 1991). Interestingly, a number of authors reveal that laypeople are not familiar with the
differences between shame and guilt either at the level of facial expression recognition (Izard,
1991) or verbal differentiation (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Thus, the expression and
understanding of these emotions seem to intersect in important ways.
Based on their shared characteristics, guilt and shame can be defined as an internal
state that is brought about by a violation of social norms and manifests itself through negative
affect and cognitions. It seems plausible that exploring general shameful affect (including guilt)
will be more beneficial than differentiating between them, especially at the functional level (i.e.
motivation for treatment, denial of feelings of remorse, patient understanding of their emotions).
Therefore, for the purposes of this paper, discussion of these emotions will be simplified by
referring to them both as shameful affect Shameful Affect in Psychopathology
Guilt and shame are disproportionately understudied compared to other negative affect,
especially considering the importance guilt and shame play in the development of
psychopathology. For instance, guilt and shame are associated with social anxiety, eating
disorders, depression, suicidal behaviors, and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD; Bryan et al,
2013; Goss & Allan, 2009; Lee, Scragg, & Turner, 2001). Although the impact of guilt and
shame in mental illness has long been noted, relatively little is known about shame from an
1

empirical perspective, and the focus of shame in the literature has largely been theoretical.
Interestingly, theorists suggest that guilt and shame are beneficial at moderate levels, but
intense feelings of guilt and shame may lead to dysfunctional behaviors (Lazarus, 1991;
Shahar, 2013). Lewis (1971) explained that experiencing intense and recurrent shame and guilt
may lead to maladaptive perfectionism, anxiety, sensitivity to rejection, interpersonal difficulties,
and increased self-reproach. From the existing body of research on shame, there is consistent
evidence demonstrating the association between shame and psychopathology, particularly
anxiety and depression (Fergus et al., 2010; Gilbert, 2000; Carvalho, 2013; Kim, Thibodeau, &
Jorgensen, 2011). It has been proposed that a restricted range of negative cognitions and
avoidance behaviors in those with shameful affect may influence the development of
psychopathology (Muris and Meesters, 2013; Lazarus, 1991).
Cognitive Biases in Shame. Cognitive theorists describe the cognitive triad as thoughts
about oneself, one’s future, and one’s experiences, which, when taken together, create
vulnerability to psychopathology (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987). In the first part, Beck (1976)
describes a negative evaluation of oneself in terms of being worthless or morally defective. This
reflects tendencies in shame, although cognitive theorists do not explicitly implicate shame in
the cognitive triad (Power, 2009). Also, cognitive theorists describe schemas, mental
representations of oneself and the world, as contributing to psychopathology (Beck, 1976;
Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987). Importantly, Beck (1976) explains that individuals selectively
attend to certain information that is congruent with their schema and selectively ignore other
incongruent stimuli. For example, a depressed individual may attend to depressing stimuli and
ignore joyful stimuli, which would reinforce the individual’s schema that the world is a
depressing place. However, the role of schemas in negative affect excluded a focus on shame.
Theoretical and empirical focus of traditional cognitive theorists was on attentional and memory
biases in anxiety and depression. In the literature on guilt and shame there is no empirical
evidence focusing on cognitive biases in information processing. However, cognitive theories
2

provide a foundation of cognitive patterns in depression and anxiety to build a model of
cognitive biases in shame around. The author proposes a cognitive model of attentional biases
in shame following a review of the literature on attentional biases in other negative affect.
Although cognitive theorists do not explicitly state the role of shame in psychopathology,
it is possible that one way shame influences mental health is through various cognitive biases.
Theorists suggest that those experiencing shame may be more likely to make stable, personal
attributions for negative events, similar to cognitive theorists’ explanation of depression
(Andrews, 1995; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Orth, Berking, & Burkhardt, 2006). For example, a
person who experiences high amounts of shame may be more likely to attribute the cause of
negative life events to permanent characteristics of him- or herself. This type of attributional
style is sometimes referred to as self-blame (Andrews, 1995). Such guilt-induced attribution
styles have been suggested by cognitive psychologists to result in feelings of depression and
social anxiety (Orth, Berking, & Burkhardt, 2006).
Social psychologist Leary (2004) describes two types of cognitions in shame. First, he
describes negative self-evaluations, in which an individual consistently evaluates him or herself
as inferior to others. Second, he described how individuals also make attributions about how
others are evaluating them. For example, a child may perceive others as judging him or her
negatively. Evaluating the self as shameful is referred to as “internal shame” in the literature;
whereas evaluating others as shaming is referred to as “external shame” (Gilbert, 2000; Lee,
Scragg, & Turner, 2001). Lazarus (1991) adds that subsequent failure to cope with initial
feelings of shame will lead to thoughts of self-blame in a “secondary appraisal process”. He
also suggests that self-blame can be thought of as misdirected attributions of responsibility, a
clearly maladaptive pattern.
Avoidance. The unwillingness to experience negative affect, called “avoidance”, has
been suggested to play a role in depression as well as anxiety disorders, such as PTSD (Foa
and Kozak, 1986; Lee, Scragg, & Turner, 2001). As described by Lazarus (1991) and Izard
3

(1991), those who experience shame often have the tendency to hide or turn away, which
topographically resembles overt avoidance behavior. Lee, Scragg, and Turner (2001) posited
that shame may often lead to dysfunctional avoidance coping strategies (e.g., substance abuse,
staying in bed to, avoiding thoughts and feelings) following a trauma. Muris and Meesters
(2013) suggest that following repeated shame and self-blame, individuals may come to rely on
avoidant interpersonal action tendencies, such as isolating, which could lead to anxiety and
depression. Furthermore, as Foa and Kozak (1986) emphasize, avoidance impedes emotional
processing of the event. In other words, without emotional processing anxiety symptoms are
maintained. There is some evidence implicating the link between shame, avoidance, and
subsequent psychopathology. For example, avoidant coping was shown to mediate the
relationship between shame and depressive symptoms in an adolescent sample (De Rubeis &
Hollenstein, 2009). In addition, Carvalho (2013) found evidence that avoidance of emotional
experiences strongly mediated the relationship between shame and depressive symptoms.
The pattern of avoidance of emotional experiences is common due to the short-term
decrease in negative emotions. Avoidance becomes problematic when used as a long-term
coping strategy, because new learning, processing, and coping strategies cannot take place.
Additionally, avoidance strategies are ineffective because they impair functioning in daily life.
Therefore, Carvalho (2013) suggests that chronically using avoidance to cope following
shameful experiences puts individuals at risk for increased psychopathology, such as
depression. One potential limitation of this study is that, although the design measures shame
from childhood and current avoidance and depressive symptoms, a cause-effect pattern cannot
be determined due to the correlational design. The analog sample also limits any conclusions
that can be made regarding those who are clinically depressed. Also, there are limitations in
memory for events in the distant past. Especially in light of the evidence on avoidance in shame,
the question arises whether self-report questionnaires can accurately detect shame in
individuals who are most avoidant of painful emotional experiences.
4

Not only does avoidance in shame play a role in the development and maintenance of
psychopathology symptoms, but this may also act as a barrier to entering treatment (Levin,
1971). In addition, many authors suggest that clients may be unable or reticent to reveal
feelings of shame in session due to its speechless nature (Levin, 1971; Feiring & Taska, 2005;
Izard, 1991). Not only do many individuals deny their experience of shame, they also tend to
avoid reflecting on it (Izard, 1991; Lazarus, 1991; Carvalho, 2013). According to emotional
processing theory, reflecting on and processing events may lead to symptom improvements
(Foa and Kozak, 1991; Shahar, 2013). Thus, the avoidance aspect of shame may inhibit
individuals from seeking treatment, communicating feelings of shame to their provider, and
active processing of feelings of shame.
Shame in Anxiety. The body of research indicates that shame plays a prominent role in
certain anxiety disorders, such as Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD), Generalized Anxiety
Disorder (GAD), Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and especially Social Anxiety Disorder
(SAD). The association between shame and anxiety could be attributed to the overlap in
symptoms of depression and anxiety, considering shame plays a role in depression as well.
However, Fergus et al. (2010) found that shame was associated with GAD and SAD even when
controlling for depressive symptoms. Furthermore, using standardized measures the authors
found that changes in shame pre-to-post-treatment were associated with changes in GAD, SAD,
and obsessive-compulsive symptoms.
PTSD. Shame in PTSD has garnered more attention in the literature than many other
disorders. From a conceptual perspective, Lee, Scragg, and Turner (2001) posit that internal
and external shame influence schemas following a trauma in different ways. Following a trauma,
an individual may experience internal shame when a trauma confirms negative self-evaluations
(e.g., that s/he is weak). In terms of external shame, an individual may feel devalued by others
(e.g., that others believe s/he is weak).
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Literature on shame and guilt in PTSD is largely conceptual; however, there is some
data that connects shameful affect with trauma symptomology. For example, guilt may be
associated with PTSD symptomology, but results are mixed (Leskela, Dieperink, & Thuras,
2002). Shame, on the other hand, has been found to be significantly and positively correlated
with PTSD symptom severity in a study examining 107 former prisoners of war using wellvalidated measures (Leskela, Dieperink, & Thuras, 2002). However, based on the study design,
no causal relationship can be determined.
Andrews et al. (2000) investigated the role of shame in predicting PTSD severity among
victims of crime-related trauma. Findings showed that shame and anger were the only
predictors of PTSD severity one month post-trauma, and shame was the only predictor of PTSD
severity six months post-trauma. They also found a significant correlation between a history of
childhood abuse and current PTSD symptoms, and shame mediated this association. This and
other studies indicate that shame may act as a mediator variable between sexual abuse and
subsequent psychopathology such as depression, bulimia, and PTSD (Feiring & Taska, 2005;
Andrews et al., 1995, 2000).
Social Anxiety. In regards to shame, social anxiety has received the most research
compared to other anxiety disorders. This is likely due to the notion that shame and social
anxiety share many features, which has been emphasized by a variety of theorists (Gilbert,
2000; Matos et al., 2013; Shahar, 2013) and corroborated by some initial research. For
example, Gilbert (2000) investigated shared aspects of shame, social anxiety, and depression.
Results confirmed the hypothesis that shame, social anxiety, and depression are correlated with
feelings of inferiority. Additionally, these three were associated with more submissive social
behaviors (e.g., agreeing one was wrong). Interestingly, when controlling for social anxiety,
shame and depression were no longer significantly correlated. On the other hand, when
depression was controlled for, shame and social anxiety remained significantly correlated. The
author suggests this implies that the role of shame in depression may operate through social
6

anxiety. However, the author failed to provide a rationale for the samples used (109 psychology
students; 50 hospitalized depressed patients). Further, it is unclear why the author utilized
individuals diagnosed with depression but failed to find participants diagnosed with social
anxiety.
Conceptually, there are many overlapping characteristics of social anxiety and shame.
First, they share the element of self-consciousness. Similar to shame, social anxiety is said to
include self-focused attention, in which awareness is concentrated on an individual’s own
physiological sensations, emotions, or cognitions (Morrison & Heimberg, 2013). Theorists
suggest that self-focused attention prevents awareness of new experiences and subsequent
learning to disprove negative cognitive biases (Clark, 2005; Morrison & Heimberg, 2013).
Theorists suggest that the heightened awareness of the self may lead to negative selfevaluation in both social anxiety and shame (Fergus et al., 2010). Repeated self-blame about
failures and self-criticism involving thoughts of one’s worthlessness and core deficiencies are
hypothesized to lead to negative self-evaluation in social anxiety and shame (Shahar, 2013).
Second, social anxiety and shame share the tendency of making attributions of being
negatively evaluated by others (Clark, 2005; Leary, 2004). In fact, an intense fear of negative
evaluation from others is considered a central feature of social anxiety (Morrison & Heimberg,
2013) and is related to the concept of external shame. Clark (2005) describes socially anxious
individuals as experiencing discomfort in the presence of others and an increased predisposition
to feelings of embarrassment, which reflects the shame experience as described by Izard
(1991) and Lazarus (1991). Therefore, “biased processing of social cues” is implicated by many
theorists to account for the maintenance of social anxiety (Clark, 2005; Morrison & Heimberg,
2013).
Third, they both involve ruminative worry. Clark (2005) describes evidence that
rumination is association with social anxiety disorder. Although Orth, Berking, and Burkhardt
(2006) did not examine anxiety in their study, their findings reveal that shame is correlated with
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rumination. Buss (1980) posits that rumination about social contact is associated with both
shame and social anxiety by means of self-consciousness.
Fourth, social anxiety and shame have some overlap in regards to behavioral
tendencies. For example, both are associated with blushing and physiological arousal (Morrison
& Heimberg, 2013). Further, social avoidance is a hallmark of both shame and social anxiety
(Clark, 2005). Additional overlapping response styles include unassertiveness and submission
(Morrison & Heimberg, 2013).
In his emotion-focused therapy model for social anxiety, Shahar (2013) proposes that
shame is linked to social anxiety. He describes shame as a primary emotional response to a
humiliating situation. The resulting social anxiety is a secondary reaction to repeated shame
experiences, in which worries arise regarding exposure of one’s defects. According to Shahar
(2013), these worries result in hypervigilance in social settings and information processing
biases. For example, attention to others may be biased in terms of noticing any signs of
disapproval (Clark, 2005). Shahar (2013) suggests that shame processing may be the
mechanism through which social anxiety lessens, and evoking and processing shame should
therefore be the target of treatment.
Shame in Depression. A majority of the literature on shame in psychopathology
focuses on depression. Using a non-clinical sample, Carvalho (2013) found that the frequency
and intensity of shame-provoking events during childhood was correlated with depressive
symptoms later in life. In a meta-analysis of 20 studies on shame in children and adolescents,
results indicated that there is a modest correlation between shame and psychopathology
symptoms of depression, anger, and aggression/delinquency (Muris & Meesters, 2013). Kim,
Thibodeau, and Jorgensen (2011) conducted a meta-analysis on 108 correlational studies on
shame and depression published between 1987 and 2010. Their findings revealed that
associations with depression were stronger for shame compared to guilt. In addition, larger
effect sizes were seen in external shame compared to internal shame. Orth, Berking, and
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Burkhardt (2006) found that rumination mediated the shame-depression link. They explain the
significance of their findings by suggesting that rumination may help to problem solve ways to
maintain belongingness with others, but also results in repeated negative self-evaluation,
leading to depressive symptoms.
Although no studies elucidate the causal pathway between shameful affect and
psychopathology, Frewen et al. (2013) investigated the perceived causal relationship between
shame and symptoms of anxiety and depression. Individuals were asked to rate their belief as
to the cause-effect pathway that led to their symptomatology. Results indicated that individuals
were more likely to attribute shame as a cause of depression than depression as a cause of
shame. Although results showed that individuals were more likely to attribute anxiety as a cause
of depression than depression as a cause of anxiety, no relationship was found between shame
and anxiety, suggesting that individuals may perceive shame to be more similar to their
experience of depression compared to their experience of anxiety A notable limitation to this
study is the possibility of introspective limitations and demand characteristics. Individuals may
not be aware of the presence, degree, or temporal association of certain emotions and
symptoms, and they may also be motivated to misreport the causal relationships. In addition,
shame-guilt was assessed by only one-item, limiting its validity as a measure of shameful affect,
and the study failed to use standardized instruments to assess for other symptoms. Also, it
seems that understanding the perception of a cause-effect relationship reveals more about
attributions of the sequence compared to the actual cause-effect relationship.
In addition to replicating the finding from prior research that shame was associated with
depressive symptoms, Andrews, Qian, and Valentine (2002) found evidence that shame
predicted additional significant variance in depressive symptoms at a second time point,
suggesting that shame may play a role in the development of symptoms.
Although there is increasing research on the role of shame in psychopathology, there
are no studies that focus on any level of information processing in shame. Given the
9

relationships between shame and both anxiety and depression, research on attentional biases
in anxiety and depression may guide initial research on information processing in shameful
affect at the level of attention biases.

Attentional Biases in Shame-Relevant Affect
Attention refers to the ability to concentrate, process, and attend to information, and can
occur at either the conscious or unconscious level. Due to the vast amount of information
individuals are presented with every moment, the attentional system selects information to
attend to and information to ignore. Cognitive theorists have long held that attentional biases are
a central feature of mood disorders (Beck, 1976). The literature on attentional biases in
psychopathology focuses on anxiety and depression. Although shame plays a key role in
psychopathology, research and theoretical models on information processing in shame is
lacking. Because both attention biases and shameful affect influence psychopathology it is of
crucial importance to determine the existence and patterns of attentional biases in shame. Due
to the overlap between shame and anxiety/depression, as aforementioned, understanding
attention processing in anxiety and depression may shed light on possible attention processing
patterns in shame.

Methodologies of Attention Bias Research
Studies assessing attentional biases have utilized various methodologies in terms of
type of paradigm, length of stimuli exposure, and type of stimuli.
Paradigms. The literature on attention biases is vast and a number of paradigms have
been generated to assess for biases. Two of the most common methods include the visual dot
probe task and the emotional Stroop (Bar-Haim, 2007).
Dot probe. MacLeod, Mathews, and Tata (1986) modified the dot probe task to assess
visual encoding of threatening stimuli. The dot probe task is a computer-based task that
10

presents a series of threat-neutral (or sad-neutral, etc.) trials to the participant (MacLeod,
Mathews, and Tata, 1986; Bar-Haim, 2007; Wald et al, 2013). Trials begin with a screen briefly
(e.g., 500 ms) displaying fixation crosses. Next a threat-neutral word pair (e.g., dead, data) or
pictorial pair (threatening face, neutral face) is presented briefly (e.g., 500ms, 1000ms). Lastly,
the words or pictures disappear and a probe (e.g., dots, arrows) appears in the empty space of
one of the stimuli. In typical dot probes participants are instructed to indicate the identity of the
probes (e.g., one or two dots; arrow up or down) or to indicate the location of the probe (e.g.,
left or right) by making a key press (Mogg & Bradley, 2005; Bar-Haim, 2007). The probes are
present until a response is made. Participants are instructed to respond quickly and accurately.
Attention vigilance or threat bias is defined as attentional bias towards a threatening cue.
Conversely, attention avoidance is attentional bias away from a threatening cue (MacLeod,
Mathews, & Tata, 1986; Wald et al, 2013). In terms of the dot probe, threat bias is reflected
when participants are faster at identifying targets that replace threatening stimuli than they are
at identifying targets that replace non-threatening stimuli. For example, if the participant is faster
at responding when dots replaced words like “dead” and slower when dots replaced words like
“data”, this indicates the participant is attending to the word “dead” prior to the target.
Conversely, threat avoidance is thought to be reflected in participants who are faster to detect
targets replacing neutral stimuli and slower to detect targets replacing threat stimuli (Wald et al,
2013). Furthermore, the addition of happy-neutral trials could provide evidence for a bias
towards or away from positive stimuli (Bar-Haim, 2007).
Emotional Stroop. The Emotional Stroop is a modification of the color-naming Stroop
developed in the 1930s (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). The original Stroop effect refers to decreased
performance when incongruent (e.g., the word green printed in red) stimuli are presented
compared to when congruent stimuli (e.g., the word green printed in green) are presented.
Semantic incongruence is thought to interfere with the ability to exclusively attend to color. In
the Emotional Stroop, threat-bias is reflected in decreased performance in naming the color of
11

threat-related stimuli (e.g., the printed color of the word “cancer” or the color of an angry face)
compared to naming the color of neutral stimuli (e.g., “plate” or a neutral face).
According to a meta-analysis, both the Stroop and dot probe paradigms are associated
with significant within-subject and between-group effects. Effect sizes for these two paradigms
were comparable and did not differ significantly (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). However, some
researchers have criticized the Stroop on the belief that it may not be measuring attention bias,
but rather may be measuring avoidance or cognitive preoccupation instead. For example, the
Stroop requires suppression of a response and ignoring emotion stimuli in order to provide the
correct response.
In contrast, the dot probe allows individuals to freely attend to emotion stimuli, which has
been argued to be a more “naturalistic” paradigm (Gotlib et al, 2004). Another benefit to the dot
probe is that the probe itself is neutral, thereby allowing response latencies to the probe to be a
direct assessment of attentional allocation instead of response biases or arousal (Bar-Haim et
al., 2007). The dot probe also has the added benefit of allowing for variation of the duration
between the stimulus presentation and the probe, termed the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA).
Exposure of the stimuli may be subliminal or supraliminal. Because of these benefits of the dot
probe paradigm over the Stroop, research using the dot probe task to measure attention biases
will be highlighted.

Variants of Dot Probe
Length of Stimulus Exposure. Examining the time-course of attentional biases is
imperative in clarifying whether individuals maintain attentional vigilance or show
disengagement from threatening stimuli. Thus, understanding the impact of the length of stimuli
exposure on attentional biases is warranted.
In a meta-analysis Bar-Haim et al. (2007) found significant differences in effect sizes
between 5 studies that utilized subliminal exposures (< 500 ms) compared to 25 studies that
12

utilized supraliminal exposures (500 - 1000 ms) in dot probe tasks. Threatening stimuli
presented at all exposure durations produced a significant threat bias in anxious participants,
although effect sizes for studies using subliminal exposure of stimuli were almost twice the
effect size of studies using supraliminal exposures; however, there were far fewer subliminal
studies included in analyses. Bar-Haim et al. (2007) also found differences in nonanxious
control groups at different exposure times. They found that control groups showed significant
threat avoidance using subliminal exposure of stimuli, but showed no significant effect at
supraliminal exposures. Additionally, significant differences were found between anxious
participants and controls for subliminal and 500 ms stimulus exposure times, but not for longer
exposure times. Based on this literature, in order to investigate the time-course of attentional
processing in negative affect, employing multiple stimulus exposure lengths seems optimal to
assess both early and later attentional patterns.
Types of Stimuli. Researchers have begun to debate which type of stimuli ─ words or
faces ─ are optimal to assess attentional biases using the dot probe. A majority of the initial
research on attention biases in anxiety utilized word stimuli. However, many recent studies have
begun using pictures of human faces displaying facial expressions. Peschard (2013) suggested
that pictorial stimuli reveal more accurate findings than studies using word stimuli. He explains
that the processing of faces involves a separate neural pathway from processing of word stimuli.
Processing faces is automatic, bypasses semantic processing, and is thought to be more
indicative of real-world stimuli and attention biases (Bradley, Mogg, & Millar, 1997; Bar-Haim,
2007).
Additionally, theorists have proposed that utilizing word stimuli confounds results due to
the possibility of variable familiarity of words. Utilizing face stimuli allows researchers to rule out
word frequency of word usage as a confounding variable. For example, anxious individuals may
be more likely to use anxiety-related words in conversations or think anxiety-related thoughts.
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Therefore, these individuals may be primed to notice these words due to their increased usage
compared to usage among non-anxious individuals (Bradley et al., 1997; Bar-Haim, 2007).
Researchers have found evidence of a threat bias utilizing word stimuli (MacLeod,
Mathews, and Tata, 1986; Mogg, Bradley, & Williams, 1995; Wald et al, 2013) and face stimuli
(Gotlib et al., 2004; Bradley, Mogg, & Millar, 2000; Staugaard, 2010). However, some
inconsistencies have emerged. For example, Pishyar, Harris, and Menzies (2004) directly
compared the impact of faces and words on attentional biases. They found threat bias for faces
but not words, as they hypothesized. On the other hand, Bradley et al. (1997) had null findings
relating to threat bias when using facial stimuli. These studies are discussed in more depth
below. Of importance, a meta-analysis examining 35 dot probe studies indicated that the
magnitude of threat biases was comparable when using words (20 studies were included in
analyses) or faces (15 studies) (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Both types of stimuli produced biases
towards threatening information in anxious participants, but not in controls. The meta-analysis
also revealed that control groups demonstrated threat avoidance for threatening word stimuli,
but not face stimuli. Based on this meta-analysis there is no evidence that face stimuli produce
larger threat biases than word stimuli when using the dot probe. Additionally, more research is
needed to determine if there is a difference in threat bias between words and pictures as a
function of stimulus exposure time. One reason to expect a difference is based on differences in
timing of processing (Peschard et al., 2013). For example, processing faces is said to occur
quickly whereas semantic processing takes longer (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Therefore, it may
follow that assessing faces subliminally and words supraliminally may increase the magnitude of
effect sizes, but more research is needed to determine if this pattern holds.
Another feature of stimulus type is emotional content. Cognitive theorists predict that
individuals selectively attend to stimuli that are relevant to their domain of psychopathology,
referred to as domain-specificity. For example, individuals who are depressed may show
attention bias to stimuli reflecting sadness whereas individuals with social anxiety may show
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biases for stimuli involving socially threatening information, such as anger. Research on
domain-specificity is mixed. Some studies show evidence of an association between content of
stimulus and domain (Beck, 1976; Gotlib et al., 2004). However, others found no domainspecificity for threat biases, indicating participants showed a threat bias to any emotional stimuli
regardless of content (Mogg et al., 1995; Schofield, Inhoff, and Coles (2013). For example, one
study showed that attentional biases in GAD were not specific to anxiety-related threatening
words (“attack”, “hostile”), but also included bias towards depression-relevant words (“sad”,
worthless”) (Mogg et al., 1995). Interestingly, another study showed that all emotional
expressions (as opposed to neutral expressions) attracted participants’ attention (Schofield,
Inhoff, and Coles, 2013).
Components of Attention Processing. Most dot probe literature measures attention
biases by comparing reaction times to detect the probe when the probe replaces a valenced
stimulus, called “congruent” trials, with reaction times to detect the probe when the probe
replaces a neutral stimulus, called “incongruent” trials. Thus, positive scores indicated more
rapid detection of the probe when it replaces a valenced stimulus. However, it has been noted
(e.g., Koster et al., 2004) that attention biases can be further decomposed into two distinct
categories. Specifically, an attention bias could reflect rapid initial detection of the emotional
stimulus on relevant trials (called facilitated engagement) on congruent trials or it could reflect
difficulties moving attention away from the emotional stimulus on incongruent trials (called
difficulty disengaging). Researchers (e.g., Fox et al., 2002; Klumpp & Amir, 2009; Koster et al.,
2004; Matlow, Gard, & Berg, 2012) have devised scoring procedures for differentiating these
two sources of attention bias by comparing reaction times for congruent or incongruent trials
with reaction times on control trials in which both stimuli are neutral.
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Attentional Biases in Anxiety
The following review highlights research trends relating to attentional biases in anxiety
generally, followed by research trends specifically focused on social anxiety. These literatures
are emphasized due to the overlap in behavioral tendencies of shame and general features of
anxiety, and specifically the many overlapping features of shame with social anxiety, described
previously.

Is there a threat bias in anxiety?
There is robust evidence demonstrating an initial attentional vigilance to threat-related
information in anxiety using the dot probe paradigm (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986; Mogg et
al., 1995; Bradley et al., 2000; Mogg & Bradley, 2005; Wald, et al., 2013). Bar-Haim et al. (2007)
showed significant although modest within-subject effects across 35 dot probe studies,
indicating an increased bias to threatening stimuli compared to neutral stimuli among anxious
participants. Findings also reflected a significant and comparable combined between-group
effect size, reflecting increased bias to threatening stimuli in anxious groups compared to
control groups. Moreover, researchers have begun examining enhanced engagement and
deficient disengagement in dot probe paradigms. Evidence has been mounting that individuals
with greater anxiety display greater difficulty disengaging from emotional stimuli (Fox, Russo,
Dutton, 2002; Koster er al., 2004; Klumpp and Amir, 2009; Matlow, Gard, and Berg, 2012).
Researchers suggests that difficulty disengaging from emotional stimuli may reflect difficulty
shifting one’s attention to active coping or fear-disconfirming information, or may be due to
difficulty in decision-making and may reflect an inhibited behavioral response. Koster et al.
(2004) proposed that maintained focus on threatening stimuli likely maintains the state of
anxiety, and thus, difficulty disengaging may play a significant role in the maintenance of anxiety
disorders.
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Does the threat bias vary as a function of sample type?
Evidence indicates the presence of attentional biases in clinically anxious samples
(MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986; Mogg, et al., 1995, Wald et al., 2013) including PTSD,
generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD), social anxiety disorder (SAD), and phobias. Additionally,
significant attentional biases have been demonstrated in nonclinical samples with high selfreported anxiety (Eysenck, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1987; Broadbent & Broadbent, 1988; Bradley
et al., 2000; Pishyar et al., 2004). Bar-Haim et al. (2007) examined whether attentional biases
differ between individuals with high levels of self-reported anxiety (nonclinically anxious) and
individuals who were diagnosed with an anxiety disorder (clinically anxious) across a number of
studies. Importantly, there was no difference in the magnitude of threat biases in 16 studies
utilizing clinical samples compared to 19 studies using nonclinical anxiety samples. Studies
using either type of sample produced significant, modest effect sizes. This suggests that
nonclinical forms of anxiety are sufficient to produce attention biases.
Another factor regarding samples that should be noted is the different control groups
employed in different studies. Studies using a clinical sample typically recruited individuals from
the general population, whereby these control groups demonstrated average levels of anxiety.
Studies using nonclinically anxious individuals typically recruited a control group made up of low
self-reported anxiety. Interestingly, Bar-Haim (2007) found that the control groups of high selfreport anxiety studies demonstrated significant threat avoidance, a pattern not found in control
groups in studies using clinically anxious participants. This suggests that a bias away from
negative stimuli may act as a buffer against anxiety.
Do attentional biases show a vigilant-avoidant pattern?
Mogg, Philippot, and Bradley (2004) introduced the term vigilant-avoidant to describe
how the initial attention vigilance to threat seen in anxiety may be quickly followed by attentional
avoidance of threat. Some research corroborates this idea, although the findings on this pattern
are more inconsistent than the findings demonstrating initial threat vigilance.
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Mogg et al. (1995) found that there was no difference in the effect sizes when stimuli
were presented subliminally or supraliminally. GAD participants showed significantly more
threat vigilance to emotional stimuli presented both subliminally and supraliminally compared to
controls. These data indicate that attention bias to emotional stimuli did not depend on
awareness of stimuli, as measured by a subliminal masking procedure1 to assess preconscious
processing.
Wald et al. (2013) found that the soldiers experiencing acute stress (a combat simulation
group) showed more threat avoidance. Wald et al. (2013) compared soldiers’ attention biases
following advanced combat training to a control group with no stress exposure. Furthermore,
their findings indicated that among soldiers who were acutely stressed, those who displayed
attention threat avoidance exhibited more PTSD symptoms. Therefore, evidence of the vigilantavoidant pattern of attention bias in PTSD may be more pronounced following acute emotional
distress, such as combat or a mood-induction scenario. In summary, vigilant-avoidant threat
processing models suggest that in anxious individuals there may be an initial, automatic
vigilance toward a threat cue followed by avoidance of the threat cue when prolonged attention
is required, such as supraliminal processing.
Does tracking eye-movements help assess threat avoidance?
Some researchers have hypothesized that supplementing the dot probe task with eyetracking could provide further information into patterns of vigilance and avoidance (Schofield,
Inhoff, & Coles, 2013; Bradley et al., 2000). Eye-tracking allows measurement of covert
attention at smaller increments of time compared to the dot probe. A study using the dot probe
task did not find evidence of a bias to threatening faces in a sample of GAD individuals, but did
find evidence of this bias using eye-tracking (Mogg et al., 2000). However, this experiment

1

In subliminal conditions, the word-pair is typically replaced by a mask, a string of random letters (e.g. HRSKOTW),
usually matched for the length of the preceding word. The SOA between word-pair and mask is brief (e.g. 14 ms).
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presented dot probe stimuli for 1000ms, which may have allowed participants enough time to
orient towards and subsequently avoid the threatening stimuli.
Conversely, another study provided evidence that response times measured from stimuli
presented for 500ms in the dot probe task (covert attention) was a sufficient and valid measure
of initial attention bias (Bradley et al., 2000). Bradley et al. (2000) reported that eye movements
(overt attention) did not provide further evidence of biases due to the limited eye movements
that participants made. Therefore, the necessity of adding eye-movement data to response time
data is unresolved, but it seems that the majority of research finds attentional biases in dot
probe tasks alone.

Explanation for Mixed Findings. Inconsistencies in these findings underscore the many
methodological and population variants in the attentional bias research (Bar-Haim et al., 2007).
In terms of methodological differences, even among studies utilizing the dot probe, different
experimenters modify the dot probe in different ways, such as variability in number of trials and
procedural instructions (e.g., “look at top picture” vs. “look at central fixation cross”). In terms of
population variants among attentional bias research, some studies involve clinical samples
(participants with diagnosed anxiety disorders) and others involve nonclinical samples (those
who score high on measures of anxiety). Also, studies using high self-reported anxiety typically
refer to trait anxiety, but also seldomly refers to state anxiety (either through mood induction or
naturally occurring stress differences). Findings from the meta-analysis revealed that withingroup comparisons indicated a slightly larger effect size for studies that relied on state anxiety
compared to trait anxiety, although this difference was not statistically significant. Betweengroup comparisons, however, showed significant effect sizes only for studies that relied on trait
anxiety but not for studies that relied on state anxiety.
Further, Schofield, Inhoff, and Coles (2013) suggest that the dot probe is not an
adequate measure of avoidance because at the time of attentional shift to the probe, the
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emotional stimuli are absent. They posit that the dot probe instead measures avoidance of
“where there had been an emotional stimulus”, but they do not provide an alternative means of
measuring attentional bias other than supplementing the dot probe with eye-tracking. Perhaps
this feature of the dot probe could account for the inconsistencies in the literature regarding the
pattern of attention following initial vigilance.
Importantly, control groups also differ across studies (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Studies
utilizing clinical samples often recruit their control group from the general population whereas
studies utilizing nonclinical samples recruit a control group with lower levels of anxiety.
Furthermore, studies differ in the degree to which they rule out comorbid depression. However,
Bar Haim et al. (2007) found no differences in effect sizes between studies that excluded
comorbid mood disorders and studies that did not. This suggests that the existence of anxiety
disorders with comorbid mood disorders does not change the effect size of the attentional bias.
However, the number of studies that ruled out comorbid depression was low, possibly
underpowering this analysis.
These varied procedures and findings highlight the necessity of carefully choosing
stimuli and samples. Despite these methodological variations, studies using the dot probe
paradigm have provided compelling evidence of the presence of a threat bias in anxiety.

Attentional Biases in Social Anxiety. A review of the literature on attentional biases in
social anxiety, a construct theoretically relevant to shame, may provide further insight into
potential attention biases in shame. Research into attentional biases in those with social anxiety
is particularly relevant for developing predictions regarding attentional biases in those with
shameful affect.
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Does the threat bias vary as a function of sample type in social anxiety?
Many studies indicate there is an attentional bias toward threatening stimuli in those who
are socially anxious (Gotlib et al, 2004; Chen et al., 2004). Of importance, empirical evidence
indicates that the magnitude of the threat-related bias does not differ as a function of anxiety
disorder (GAD, panic, social anxiety disorder, PTSD, OCD, or simple phobia) (Bar-Haim, et al.,
2007). However, a nuanced analysis of social anxiety research on attentional biases studies
sheds light in the research methodology common to this particular topic.
Just as in anxiety, an attentional bias to threat has been detected in clinical (Mogg et al.,
2004) and nonclinical (Helfinstein, et al., 2008; Klumpp & Amir, 2009; Pishyar et al., 2004)
socially anxious samples. One exception is a study by Bradley et al. (1997) investigating
nonclinical socially anxious participants. They found a main effect for face valence, indicating
that in general participants avoided threatening faces more than happy faces. However, this did
not interact with their between-group variable, high vs. low anxiety, indicating that the high
socially anxious group was not significantly different in terms of attentional biases compared to
the low socially anxious group. Additionally, there was no evidence of differential attentional
biases as a function of gender. The study included well-validated measures and a thorough
rating procedure for inclusion of face pictures. . Although some studies using a nonclinical
socially anxious sample have detected attentional biases, this study was limited by including
participants with only mild social anxiety in the high social anxiety group. It is possible that an
attentional bias toward threat is only seen with relatively high levels of anxiety.
Do attentional biases show a vigilant-avoidant pattern in social anxiety?
Evidence regarding the time-course of processing in social anxiety shows there may be
a pattern of vigilance-avoidance, as seen in studies examining anxiety in general. Mogg et al.
(2004) showed increased threat bias to angry faces in their SAD group compared to the control
group when the SOA was 500 ms, but not when the SOA was longer at 1250 ms.
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Schofield et al. (2013) examined the time-course of attentional biases in SAD
participants with the dot probe in concurrence with eye-tracking. Eye-tracking indices indicated
that socially anxious participants attended less to emotional faces, specifically happy faces, over
time. Interestingly, attentional allocation among the socially anxious participants did not vary as
a function of emotional valence. That is, there were no differences between the biases for
happy, angry, and fearful faces, contrary to hypotheses that socially anxious participants would
show an initial bias only to negative faces. Also surprising, they found no difference in attention
vigilance in SAD participants compared to controls. Furthermore, their dot probe data did not
reach significance, and they found only limited correlation between dot probe reaction times and
eye-tracking indices. One notable reason for this deviation from prior research may be the long
stimulus exposure times (1500 ms) employed on their dot probe (Schofield et al., 2013). This is
potentially problematic due to prior literature demonstrating attentional avoidance at longer
stimulus exposure times. Because participants had longer to disengage from stimuli, this could
explain the null findings of equal attentional biases in the SAD group compared to the control
group (Mogg et al., 2004).
It should be noted that control participants showed an increasing tendency over time (at
1000 ms) to attend to happy faces and avoid negative faces. This study brings to light the value
of assessing biases to negative and positive stimuli. These authors conclude that the pattern of
attentional allocation seen in socially anxious individuals may consist of a relative lack of biases
compared to individuals without social anxiety. In other words, between-group effects may be
driven by attention patterns in the non-anxious participants, and anxious individuals’ attention
patterns may be best characterized as a lack of positive bias. Some limitations of this study
include small sample size and failure to exclude comorbid depression. In addition, they note that
eye-tracking measures overt attention, and that attention can shift without eye movement
(covert attention). Furthermore, covert attention precedes overt attention, thus eye-tracking may
not provide a full picture of attention patterns.
22

Does type of stimulus change the pattern of attentional biases in social anxiety?
One study investigated the impact of faces compared to words on attentional biases in
social anxiety (Pishyar et al., 2004). When facial stimuli were presented, those with high selfreported social anxiety showed a bias towards negative faces; the control group showed a bias
towards positive faces. Notably, neither group showed a significant bias for word stimuli. Both
words and faces were presented for 500 ms. This raises the possibility that longer processing
time is needed for attentional biases to be detected when using words. Therefore, there is some
evidence that facial stimuli may be optimal in assessing threat bias in socially anxious
individuals.

Attentional Biases in Depression
Early theorists described information processing biases in anxiety as predominantly
attending to threat in order to avoid future failures (attention bias) whereas depression involved
a ruminative focus on past failures (memory bias). Indeed, findings revealed that those with
depression show an explicit memory bias, and early studies seemed to corroborate the
hypothesis that no attentional biases occurred in depression (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986;
Dalgeish & Watts, 1990). However, there are some potential methodological limitations in the
early studies that could explain the null findings in depression. First, MacLeod, Mathews, and
Tata (1986) did not appropriately match the anxiety group (younger participants on average,
out-patients) to the depressive group (older participants on average, in-patients). Second, early
studies failed to use depression-relevant stimuli (Mogg et al., 1995). Third, Mogg et al. (1995)
suggested that these early studies did not focus on clinically depressed participants. Lastly, the
probes on early versions of the dot probe did not occur on every trial. Further, the probes
appeared more on trials containing threat words. Thus, early dot probes may have a
confounding learning variable.
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What is the pattern of attentional biases in depression?
Currently, although there is limited research on attentional biases in depression, there is
increasing evidence indicating an attention bias may exist in depression (Mathews & MacLeod,
1994; Mathews, Ridgeway, & Williamson, 1996; Peckham, 2010). For instance, Mathews &
MacLeod (1994) found that depressed individuals showed greater attention bias to socially
threatening information than the anxious group. Alternately, the anxious group displayed greater
vigilance to physically-threatening stimuli as compared to the depressed group. However,
similar to the Mogg et al. (1995) study, Mathews & MacLeod (1994) did not rule out the
presence of co-morbid anxiety disorders in their depressed groups. Thus, a potential alternative
explanation of the results could be that the anxiety component could be driving the attentional
vigilance patterns found in those who were depressed.
Of importance, biases have been demonstrated using dysphoric stimuli in depressed
individuals when the stimuli are presented at later stages of processing (i.e. supraliminally).
Gotlib et al. (2004) found this pattern using carefully diagnosed individuals with Major
Depressive Disorder. Mogg et al. (1995) demonstrated that anxious and depressed participants
showed supraliminal bias to negative words; subliminally only anxious individuals showed this
pattern.
Thus, evidence shows that depression-related attentional biases are more pronounced
when negative stimuli are presented at longer durations, thus allowing for more elaborative
processing, according to Mogg and Bradley (2005). Such differences from anxiety-related
attention biases indicate that there could be different cognitive biases at play for anxiety and
depression. Biases in depression are thought to reflect difficulty disengaging from negative
stimuli. The existence of a supraliminal bias in depression may indicate that more elaborative
processing needs to occur in order to detect biases in attention (Mogg & Bradley, 2005). Mogg
et al. (1995) found supraliminal attention biases for negative words (both anxiety- and
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depression-relevant) in those who had a primary diagnosis of major depressive disorder
(according to DSM-III-R) compared to controls.
The lack of consistent findings regarding biases in depression could reflect slowed
response times due to psychomotor retardation (Mogg & Bradley, 2005). Also, null findings in
response to external threat cues may indicate that depressed individuals are more preoccupied
with internal rumination. However, generally speaking, anxiety tends to show more attentional
vigilance at earlier processing stages, whereas depression shows difficulty disengaging
attention from sad stimuli at somewhat later stages (Peckham, 2010).
In summary, threat-related attention biases include selective attention towards and away
from threatening stimuli (Wald, et al., 2013). Generally, anxious individuals engage in an initial
attention bias towards the threatening stimuli, but may ultimately avoid the stimuli from further
processing. Evidence shows that depressed individuals may have an attention bias towards
negative stimuli at later stages of processing. Understanding the role of attention vigilance,
avoidance, engagement and disengagement in shame may help disentangle different
components of selective attention within the information processing chain.
Notably, the current study is one of only a few studies that utilized multiple control
groups within the same dot probe by displaying the critical affect of disgust and additionally
displaying sad and happy faces, thus allowing us to evaluate the effects of general negative
affect and positive affect on our reaction times. Our dot probe is also unique in that it evaluated
the time course of attentional biases by utilizing multiple stimulus duration times. Thus, the
current study provides unique contributions to the growing body of literature on information
processing in negative affect.

Specific Aims
Given the considerations discussed above, the first primary aim of the current study was
to determine whether there is an attentional bias in shame. The second primary aim was to
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determine the time course of such biases by varying the duration of exposure of faces. Based
on current trends in the literature, we utilized the dot probe paradigm to accomplish these aims.
We compared dot probe performance of participants with low, moderate, and high levels of
shame at varying stimuli exposure durations. We predicted patterns similar to those found in
studies on social anxiety based on significant similarities between social anxiety and shame,
especially the theoretical conceptualizations that include both negative evaluation from others
and biased processing of social cues (Clark, 2005; Shahar, 2013). Specifically, we predicted
initial (at 150 ms) attention biases to threatening stimuli in those experiencing high levels of
shame (Hypothesis 1a) and attention biases away from threatening stimuli in those experiencing
low levels of shame (Hypothesis 1b). In line with the majority of prior research on social anxiety,
we also predicted attention biases away from threatening stimuli in shameful individuals and
controls at longer stimulus exposure durations (Hypothesis 2).
We also have one secondary aim, which was to determine whether our face stimuli
would induce a change in affect over time. Because participants viewed more negativelyvalenced photographs (sad and disgusted) than positively-valenced photographs (happy) we
hypothesized that our dot probe would induce negative affect. In other words, we predicted that
participants would report an increase in negative affect and a decline in positive affect when
comparing their emotional state prior to the dot probe to their emotional state immediately
following the dot probe (Hypothesis 3).
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Research Design Overview
The specific aims of the current study were evaluated by comparing dot probe
performance between those with varying levels of shame. The current study focused on women
due to higher average levels of shame among women compared to men (Feiring, Taska, and
Lewis, 1996). Our recruitment procedure involved online screening with the ESS. Based on the
range and distribution of scores obtained in prior thesis research (Grout, 2014 unpublished
data), our original plan was to draw equally from the bottom (ESS score < 37), middle (ESS
score between 38 and 54, inclusive), and top (ESS > 55) thirds of the prior Experiences of
Shame Scale (ESS) scores. A differential percentage of invitations were made to potential
participants based on ESS scores that could be flexibly adjusted to insure parallel recruitment of
similar numbers of participants in each of the three ESS groups. We anticipated that there
would be fewer participants with extreme high or low scores, compared with moderate scores.
Accordingly, we initially invited 100% of participants with low and high scores, and a random
60% of participants with moderate scores. From time to time, the percentages being invited
from each group were adjusted to slow down the flow of one or more groups.
Unfortunately, the recruitment procedure did not yield the expected distribution of ESS
scores, a significant plurality (48.8%) of those who attended session had scores falling in the
high shame category, and only a small minority of participants had scores falling in the low
shame category (12.8%). As a result, we shifted our grouping strategy to create three groups
based on ESS scores obtained during the in-person study session, comparing the bottom,
middle, and top thirds of the distribution of ESS scores. The revised low shame group included
scores of 43 and below, the revised moderate shame group included scores between 44 and
62, inclusive, and the revised high shame group would include scores of 63 and above.
The study design overview is illustrated in Figure 1. Eligible participants were invited to
attend the session and provided with a code to sign up for a timeslot for the in-person study
session. Upon arrival to session, all participants completed informed consent, a demographics
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questionnaire (see Appendix A), self-report questionnaires (see Appendix B-G), and the dot
probe task. We counterbalanced the order in which participants completed the questionnaires
and the dot probe attention task. All participants completed the Positive and Negative Affect
Scale (PANAS) before, during, and after the dot probe as a manipulation check. Participants
where then divided into three groups based on the ESS scores obtained during the in-person
session. Group assignment was based on participants falling within the top, middle, or bottom
thirds of the ESS distribution and group assignment was completed prior to analyzing data from
the dot probe task.
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Screening

Make appointment and sign
consent

PANAS
Dot Probe
Task1
PANAS2

Questionnaires3

Low Shame

Moderate Shame

High Shame

Figure 1. Study Design Overview
1

The order of administration of the questionnaires and the dot probe task was counterbalanced
across participants.
2

The PANAS was also administered during the break within the dot probe task.

3

The Experience of Shame Scale was used post hoc to divide participants among the three
groups.
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Dot probe design overview. The current study evaluated attention biases in shameful
affect using pictorial stimuli based on a few considerations. First, comparable results were found
in dot probe studies using word stimuli compared to pictorial stimuli (Bar-Haim et al., 2007).
Second, theorists argue that showing pictorial stimuli bypasses semantic processing that
showing words would require (Pishyar et al., 2004). Third, utilizing pictorial stimuli bypasses the
confounding variable of differences in word familiarity (Bradley, 1997).
Due to the fact that some research suggests that attentional bias may be different for
short vs. long durations of critical stimuli, short, medium, and long exposure times were utilized
in order to capture the time course of attentional biases in shame. Specifically, our dot probe
presented stimuli for 150 ms, 500 ms, and 1000 ms. Each face was displayed at each exposure
length.
Based on the premise that we sought to measure biases in participants experiencing
shame, we suggested that the critical face stimuli be chosen based on its shame-inducing
potential. We hypothesized that presenting faces portraying shame may not have an adequate
“contagion-effect” of inducing shame in the participant. By contrast, we hypothesized that faces
expressing disgust would be more effective in inducing shame, particularly among those prone
to feeling shame. Thus, faces portraying disgust served as the critical stimuli in the dot probe
task. Furthermore, in order to investigate domain-specificity of shame, faces displaying
alternate affect were also included in the dot probe. In order to rule out the impact of general
negative affect, we presented sad faces. In order to rule out the impact of any valenced affect,
we presented happy faces. Presenting happy faces could also help rule out if shameful
individuals’ attention patterns are characterized by a lack of positive bias compared to controls.
Therefore, our valenced stimuli included faces displaying disgust, sadness, and happiness.
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Methods
Recruitment and Screening
Participants were recruited from a population of undergraduate women taking
psychology classes at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. Exclusion criteria for our study
will be: (1) identification as male and (2) less than 18 years of age or more than 60. Potential
participants were screened for eligibility using a screener questionnaire in SONA, the university
web-portal for research participation. We used the Experience of Shame Scale (ESS; described
below) as the shame screener in the attempt recruit equivalently for a priori determined low,
moderate, and high levels of shame. No data was retained from the screener. As noted
previously, our initial recruitment and screening plan failed to produce the desired distribution of
ESS scores, with individuals scoring at or above 55 being over represented and those scoring at
or below 37 being seriously underrepresented. As a result, we subsequently adopted a post
hoc grouping strategy based on dividing participants into groups based on the bottom, middle,
and top thirds of ESS scores obtained during the in-person study session.
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Completed Screener
(n = 329)
Screening

Attended in-person session
(n = 127)

Missing data
(n = 2)
Included in analyses
(n = 125)

Low Shame
(n = 42)

Moderate
Shame
(n = 41)

Figure 2. Participant Flow
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High Shame
(n = 42)

The flow of participants from screening through final grouping is illustrated in Figure 2. A
total of 381 participants opened the screener, of which 329 (86.4%) completed it. Based on the
original a priori grouping criteria, based on the SONA screening procedure, 100% of those who
were identified as low shame were invited to participate. Of those who were identified as
experiencing moderate shame, 60% were initially invited, but this was decreased to 30% in
order to increase the proportion of participants in the low category. Of those who were identified
in the screener as high shame, 100% were initially invited but this was decreased to 5% in order
to reduce the proportion of high shame participants. Of the individuals invited to participate in
the study, 127 actually participated in the in-person study session. Due to a procedural error,
we do not have ESS scores on two participants. Accordingly, the final sample comprised 125
participants who were then categorized into low (ESS scores < 43, n = 42), moderate (ESS
scores between 44 – 62, inclusive; n = 41), and high (ESS scores > 63, n = 42) shame
categories, based on their ESS scores obtained in during the in-person session. The majority of
participants were white (76.8%), non-Hispanic (92%), and had mean age of 22.1 (ranging
between 18 and 50, SD = 4.3). A χ² was conducted to examine shame group by racial status
(i.e. white vs. non-white). No significant relationship was found (χ²(2) = .718, p > .05). Table 1
presents participant age and baseline scores for psychopathology measures.
Power Analysis
A power analysis was conducted utilizing G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner,
2007). With a minimum of 40 participants per group, and assuming a two-tailed t-test
independent samples with α = 0.05, we have 80% power to detect an effect size of d > .64.
Power to detect an effect size of d = .50 is 64%.

33

Table 1. Baseline Scores and ANOVA Summary.
Shame Category
Variable

Low

Mod.

High

F (df), p

Age

22.1(4.3)

22.3(5.1)

21.6(3.1)

22.2(4.4)

.38 (2,124), .69

ESS

54.9(17.0)

36.5(5.3)

53.7(5.3)

74.4(9.0)

330.16 (2,122), .000***

Low vs. Mod.: -14.7 (81), .000***
Low vs. High: -23.6 (82), .000***
Med. vs. High: -12.7 (81), .000***

ESS-Character.

24.1(8.3)

15.9(2.9)

22.9(3.3)

33.3(5.6)

189.04 (2,122), .000***

Low vs. Mod.: -10.3 (81), .000***
Low vs. High: -17.8 (82), .000***
Med. vs. High: -10.2 (81), .000***

ESS-Behav.

20.6(7.0)

13.6(3.3)

20.1(2.8)

28.0(4.7)

162.4 (2,122), .000***

Low vs. Mod.: -9.8 (81), .000***
Low vs. High: -16.4 (82), .000***
Med. vs. High: -9.3 (81), .000***

ESS-Bodily

10.2(3.5)

7.0(2.1)

10.7(2.6)

13.0(2.7)

61.5 (2,122), .000***

Low vs. Mod.: -6.9 (81), .000***
Low vs. High: -11.3 (82), .000***
Med. vs. High: -4.1 (81), .000***

TOSCA-Shame

46.2(11.4)

37.7(9.6)

46.3(8.5)

54.5(9.0)

36.14(2,122), .000***

Low vs. Mod.: -4.3 (81), .000***
Low vs. High: -8.3 (82), .000***
Med. vs. High: -4.2 (81), .000***

TOSCA-Guilt

64.7(8.0)

64.2(6.1)

62.4(10.1)

67.4(6.6)

4.39(2,122), .01*

Low vs. Mod.: 1.0 (81), .34
Low vs. High: -2.3 (82), .02*
Med. vs. High: -2.7 (81), .009**

TOSCA-Pride

19.1(3.8)

19.8(3.6)

18.6(4.4)

19.1(3.6)

1.05(2,122), .35
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Overall

t(df), p

10.2(9.3)

4.8(5.5)

9.7(8.1)

16.2(9.9)

21.14(2,122), .000***

Low vs. Mod.: -3.2 (81), .000***
Low vs. High: -6.5 (82), .000***
Med. vs. High: -3.3 (81), .002**

DASS-Anxiety

8.8(8.9)

3.7(4.0)

8.6(7.2)

14.2(10.8)

18.78(2,122), .000***

Low vs. Mod.: -3.8 (81), .000***
Low vs. High: -5.9 (82), .000***
Med. vs. High: -2.8 (81), .007**

DASS-Stress

16.4(9.8)

9.4(6.9)

16.3(6.9)

23.5(9.6)

33.37(2,122), .000***

Low vs. Mod.: -4.6 (81), .000***
Low vs. High: -7.7 (82), .000***
Med. vs. High: -3.9 (81), .000***

STAI-State

40.8(10.3)

35.2(8.8)

40.5(8.6)

46.8(10.1)

16.62(2,122), .000***

Low vs. Mod.: -2.8 (81), .000***
Low vs. High: -5.6 (82), .000***
Med. vs. High: -3.0 (81), .003**

STAI-Trait

45.5(11.2)

36.1(7.2)

46.0(7.8)

54.4(9.6)

51.49(2,122), .000***

Low vs. Mod.: -6.0 (81), .000***
Low vs. High: -9.9 (82), .000***
Med. vs. High: -4.4 (81), .000***

SPIN

19.8(14.3)

8.4(6.5)

18.4(11.1)

32.4(12.6)

56.43(2,122), .000***

Low vs. Mod.: -5.0 (81), .000***
Low vs. High: -11.0 (82), .000***
Med. vs. High: -5.4 (81), .000***
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DASSDepression

Note. For the mean columns, standard deviations are in parentheses. * p < .05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001

Materials
Experience of Shame Scale (ESS; Andrews, Qian, & Valentine, 2002; see
Appendix B). The ESS is a 25- item questionnaire that assesses proneness to
experience shame with a global shame score and on three dimensions:
characterological shame, behavioral shame, and bodily shame. This instrument shows
strong psychometric properties.
Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA-3; Tangney, Wanger, & Gramzow, 1989;
see Appendix C). The TOSCA-3 provides 16 scenarios and measures shame along the
dimensions of shame, guilt, pride, externalization, and detachment. This instrument
demonstrates good validity and reliability.
Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995;
see Appendix D). The DASS-21 is the short form of the 42-item DASS. The DASS-21
measures constructs of Anxiety, Depression, and Stress using a four-point scale ranging
from ‘Does not apply to me at all’ to ‘Applied to me very much, or most of the time.’
Higher scores indicate greater symptom severity. The DASS-21 shows strong
psychometric properties
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, 1970; see
Appendix E). The STAI is a 40-item questionnaire that assesses state (temporary) and
trait (stable) anxiety on a 4-point Likert scale. This instrument shows strong
psychometric properties and has been used extensively in research.
Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN; Connor et al., 2000; see Appendix F). The SPIN
is a 17-item self-report questionnaire that utilizes a 5-point Likert scale from 0 (Not at all)
to 4 (Extremely). Participants are asked to rate how much each statement applies to
them. The SPIN has demonstrated good reliability and validity.
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Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, et al., 1988; see Appendix
G). The PANAS is a 20-item self-report measure that evaluates current positive (e.g.,
excited, proud, active, enthusiastic) and negative (e.g., ashamed, scared, irritable,
nervous) emotional experiences (Watson, et al., 1988). Participants will be asked to rate
20 emotional states (10 positive; 10 negative) on a 5 point scale (1 = slightly or not at all;
5 = extreme) based on how they feel at the time of completion. Scores yield a positive
affect score and a negative affect score. The PANAS has demonstrated adequate
internal consistency and test-retest reliability.
Dot Probe Task. The dot probe task was developed for use on laptop computers
using E-Prime software and was based on the original visual dot probe task developed
by MacLeod, Mathews, and Tata (1986). E-Prime reports millisecond accuracy of
reaction times. The laptop was placed on a stand, yielding an approximate downward
visual angle of 10⁰. A keyboard attached to the computer was placed on the desk at the
level of participant’s forearms for ease of responding. Participants were seated
approximately 50 cm from the screen. All participants completed two practice trials with
no facial stimuli, in which they simply indicated the number of probes that appeared. The
remaining trials are considered critical trials, which presented a standardized set of black
and white photographs of actors and actresses portraying facial expressions (Ekman &
Friesen, 1976). The current study utilized three types of valenced emotional faces,
characterized as disgusted (D), sad (S), and happy (H). Each valenced face was paired
with one neutral (N) face of the same actor or actress. Utilizing the same actor or
actress allowed us to match each photograph pair with respect to race, gender, age,
attractiveness, etc. There were 10 photograph pairs for each affect (D-N, S-N, H-N).
Half of the photographs pairs were males; half were females. All photographs measured
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5.5 cm in width and 8 cm in height. There was 11 cm from the center of one photograph
to the center of the other.
Additionally, three N-N face pairs were presented at each of the three durations.
These three face pairs were novel faces not included in the valenced trials. Each neutral
face was paired with the same neutral face. N-N trials were used to measure attentional
engagement and disengagement by comparing attentional biases scores to these
baseline N-N trials (Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, Houwer, 2004). The D-N, S-N, H-N,
and N-N will be combined and presented in a random order to each participant.
Each probe detection trial began with a fixation cross at the center of the screen
displayed for 500 ms (see Figure 3). In the critical trials, the cross was replaced by a
face pair, displayed for one of three durations: 150ms, 500 ms, or 1000 ms. Immediately
following the offset up the photographs, a probe (one or two “ ”) appeared in the
location of one of the faces. The probe remained on the screen until the participant
made a response. Participants were instructed to indicate the type of probe that
appeared by making a key press (i.e. “1” or “2”) with the fingers of their (usually right)
hand.
We counterbalanced valenced-face location (valenced face on top or bottom),
the probe type (1 or 2 dots), and probe location (top or bottom). Thus, the valenced
faces appeared an equivalent number of times in the top and bottom positions with the
neutral face appearing in the other position. Additionally, the probe appeared an
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Figure 3. Sequence of events in an incongruent dot probe trial with a valenced
face pair

equivalent number of times in the top and bottom positions, and replaced the valenced
face as often as a neutral face. Due to counterbalancing a high number of variables,
each of the D-N, S-N, H-N, and N-N pairs were presented twelve times, resulting in a
total of 398 trials (120 trials for each affect + 36 neutral-neutral trials + 2 practice trials).
Participants were given a break to rest their eyes following the 199th trial. During the
break, participants completed the PANAS.
Scoring. Three attention biases indices were calculated for each participant,
including the conventional attention bias index (AB), the facilitated engagement index
(FE), and the difficulty disengaging index (DD; Koster et al., 2004; see Table 2). The AB
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index for each participant was calculated by taking the mean response time of trials in
which the probe appeared at the location of the neutral face (incongruent trial reaction
times) and subtracting the mean response time of trials in which the probe appeared at
the location of the valenced face (congruent trial reaction times). Positive scores indicate
a bias towards the emotional face, with faster reaction times on congruent trials than
incongruent trials (vigilance). In terms of the disgust trials, positive scores indicate an
attentional bias towards threatening information, or threat vigilance. On these trials,
negative scores indicate an attentional bias away from threat (i.e. threat avoidance).
To calculate the FE and DD indices, we included N-N trials as suggested by
Koster et al (2004). The N-N trials function as a baseline measure in that there is no
affective information to shift participants’ attention. Comparing trials that contain affective
information to trials with neutral-only information allows us to evaluate components of
visual attention, such as enhanced engagement or difficulty disengaging, which we
cannot do using the conventional bias index. For the FE index we took the mean
reaction times for N-N trials and subtracted the mean reaction times of congruent trials.
When participants were faster to respond to congruent trials compared to neutral trials,
(positive FE scores), this reflects facilitated engagement to the valenced faces. Negative
scores indicated slowed engagement to the valenced face pairs compared to neutral
face pairs. For the DD index, we took the mean reaction times of incongruent trials and
subtracted the mean reaction times for N-N trials. Positive scores reflect difficulty
disengaging, indicating that the participant was faster to respond to the N-N baseline
trials than the incongruent trials. Negative scores reflect eased disengagement,
indicating that participants had no difficulty disengaging.
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Table 2. Calculation and Interpretation of Indices of Attention Bias.
Attention Index

Conventional Attention
Bias (AB)

Facilitated
Engagement (FE)

Difficulty
Disengaging (DD)

Formula

AB = IRT - CRT

FE = NRT - CRT

DD = IRT - NRT

+ AB = Vigilance for
emotional faces

+FE = Facilitated
engagement for
emotional

+ DD = Difficulty
disengaging from
emotional faces

(faster to respond on
congruent trials than
incongruent trials)

(faster to respond on
congruent trials than
neutral trials)

(faster to respond on
neutral trials than
incongruent trials)

-AB = Avoidance of
emotional faces

-FE = Slowed
engagement to
emotional faces

-DD = Eased
disengagement from
emotional faces

(slower to respond on
congruent trials than
incongruent trials)

(slower to respond on
congruent trials than
neutral trials)

(slower to respond on
neutral trials than
incongruent trials)

Interpretation of
positive scores

Interpretation of
negative scores

Note. IRT = mean reaction time on incongruent trials; CRT = mean reaction time on
congruent trials; and NRT = mean reaction time on neutral trials.
Procedure
Participants were screened prior to arrival to the lab to determine their level of
shame. Prescreening data was not retained. Eligible participants were provided with a
code that allowed them to sign-up for a study timeslot. Participants were asked to attend
one two-hour session. Upon arrival to the laboratory, an experimenter led the participant
into a private room and explained the informed consent document for the study. After
written consent was obtained, the experimenter directed the participant’s attention to a
laptop computer that was used to administer all the self-report measures and the
attention task. All materials were administered on a 14-inch Dell Latitude E6410 laptop
with an Intel Core i7 processor. Approximately half of the participants then completed the
demographic questionnaires and self-report measures first, followed by the attention
task; the remaining participants completed the attention task first, followed by the
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demographics questionnaires and self-report measures. The order with which
participants completed these tasks was determined by a random number generator, and
was recorded for analyses. For all participants, the PANAS was administered three
times: before, during (at the break), and after the attention task in order to evaluate any
changes in positive and negative affect.
Demographic and self-report measures were administered using the program
Qualtrics. The experimenter provided brief instructions for the completion of the selfreport measures. The participant completed these forms in private and informed the
experimenter upon completion.
For the attention task, the experimenter provided a brief introduction to the task,
and initiated the dot probe program using E-Prime. The experimenter left the room
during testing but was available for questions from the participant. Detailed instructions
for responding were provided within the dot probe program, described as follows.
Participants were instructed that their goal was to identify the number of dots as quickly
and accurately as possible. They were informed that a dot may appear at the top or
bottom position of the screen and they were to press the 1 key if there was one dot and
the 2 key if there were two dots. Participants were instructed to keep two fingers from
the same hand on the 1 and 2 keys. They were given a break halfway through the trials,
in which they were instructed to rest their eyes for one minute and complete the PANAS.
Participants completed a total of 398 trials, and they were instructed to contact the
experimenter upon completion.
After the participant completed the self-report measures (including the PANAS
before and after the attention task) and the attention task, the experimenter conducted a
debriefing that described the purposes of the study and provided available resources for
local mental health services. The debriefing procedure occurred for all participants who
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have given consent to participate. All experimenters were trained by the principle
investigators of the study. Any participant indicating she was experiencing acute distress
upon completing the study was directed to a graduate student in clinical psychology.
This occurred one time. Furthermore, Dr. Cahill, the faculty adviser for this study, was
also available for providing assistance to distressed participants.

Results
All error and outlier trials were excluded from analyses. The number of errors
made by participants ranged from 0 to 144 (M = 13.5, SD = 17.27). Errors occurred on
3.46% of trials. Additionally, trials with reaction times shorter than 100 ms (considered
an anticipation error) or longer than 1,000 ms (considered a concentration error) were
excluded from analyses. The number of outliers per participant ranged from 0 to 111 (M
= 8.43, SD = 16.94). Overall there were 2.06% outlier trials. Analyses were performed
on the remaining data.
Attention biases were measured by reaction times to probes following
presentation of faces. Scoring procedures for our three attention bias indices are
described in Materials. We computed average reaction times of the trials that are used
to compute each of the three bias indices (i.e., congruent, incongruent, neutral-neutral)
by shame group at each stimulus exposure duration (e.g., 150, 500, 1000ms). These
means are presented in Table 3.
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Table 3. Mean Dot Probe Reaction Times (ms) by Trial Type and Mean Differences for Bias Scores
Low Shame (n = 42)
Moderate Shame (n = 41)
Affect
150 ms
500 ms
1000 ms
150 ms
500 ms
1000 ms
Disgust Incongruent 555 (60)
552 (62)
552 (61)
536 (53)
535 (48)
533 (50)
Congruent
547 (67)
541 (68)
548 (69)
533 (51)
539 (54)
536 (48)

High Shame (n = 42)
150 ms
500 ms
1000 ms
564 (60) 570 (63) 569 (65)
560 (64) 559 (69) 561 (61)

Sad

Incongruent
Congruent

546 (61)
541 (64)

540 (72)
553 (60)

551 (67)
548 (66)

531 (49)
530 (44)

538 (50)
531 (49)

535 (51)
532 (51)

567 (57)
564 (59)

566 (63)
565 (59)

563 (57)
568 (66)

Happy

Incongruent
Congruent

550 (66)
541 (67)

551 (62)
547 (62)

549 (62)
542 (59)

538 (50)
536 (42)

534 (52)
536 (48)

534 (47)
535 (51)

562 (61)
563 (59)

564 (61)
561 (61)

562 (60)
557 (64)

AB Index
FE Index
DD Index

557 (75)
8 (29)
10 (39)
-2 (39)

545 (64)
11 (38)
4 (47)
7 (37)

554 (66)
4 (39)
6 (40)
-2 (37)

542 (52)
3 (30)
9 (35)
-6 (37)

538 (52)
-4 (30)
-1 (38)
-3 (44)

544 (57)
-3 (28)
8 (37)
-11 (32)

558 (61)
4 (24)
-2 (30)
6 (32)

558 (72)
11 (26)
-1 (37)
12 (30)

562 (69)
8 (32)
1 (37)
7 (31)

AB Index
FE Index
DD Index

5 (32)
16 (41)
-11 (40)

-13 (61)
-8 (35)
-5 (31)

3 (30)
6 (39)
-3 (38)

1 (36)
12 (34)
-11 (40)

7 (31)
7 (46)
0 (38)

3 (36)
12 (47)
-9 (39)

3 (29)
-6 (29)
9 (31)

1 (46)
-7 (31)
8 (35)

-5 (37)
-6 (32)
1 (39)

2 (27)
6 (36)
-4 (39)

-2 (32)
2 (38)
-4 (48)

-1 (35)
9 (42)
-10 (39)

-1 (28)
-5 (28)
4 (36)

3 (25)
-3 (33)
6 (30)

5 (30)
5 (29)
-0.3 (30)

Neutral
Disgust
44

Sad

Happy

AB Index
9 (33)
4 (32)
7 (31)
FE Index
16 (42)
-2 (40)
12 (38)
DD Index
-7 (49)
6 (39)
-5 (35)
Note. Standard Deviations are shown in parentheses.

Table 4. ANOVA Summary of Conventional Attention Bias Index
Source of Variance

F

Df

p

Affect

1.24

(2,238)

.29

Duration

0.47

(2,238)

.62

Order

1.14

(1,119)

.29

Group

1.06

(2,119)

.35

Affect X Duration

0.30

(4,476)

.88

Affect X Group

2.04

(4, 238)

.09

Affect X Order

0.80

(2,238)

.45

Duration X Group

0.70

(4,238)

.60

Duration X Order

0.14

(2,238)

.87

Group X Order

1.02

(2,119)

.36

Affect X Duration X Group

1.20

(8, 476)

.30

Affect X Duration X Order

1.60

(4,476)

.17

Affect X Order X Group

0.20

(4,238)

.94

Duration X Order X Group

2.62

(4,238)

.03*

Affect X Duration X Order X Group

0.44

(8,476)

.90

Note. * indicates significance at the .05 level.
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For each of the three attention bias indices, we calculated separate 4-way mixed
factorial ANOVAs to compare the effects of affect (disgust, sad, and happy), stimulus
exposure duration (150 ms, 500 ms, and 1,000 ms), order of administration
(questionnaires first or dot-probe first), and shame group (low, medium, or high) on bias
scores. Order of administration and shame group served as the between-group
variables.
ANOVA results for the conventional bias index are summarized in Table 4. This
analysis yielded a significant duration X group X order interaction, F(4,238) = 2.62 , p <
.05). Following the strategy of Fisher’s test (Keppel & Zedick, 1989), we investigated
simple main effects for the significant duration X group X order interaction. More
specifically, for each order we invested the simple main effect of duration within each
shame group.
The means for this interaction are presented in Figures 4a (dot probe first) and
4b (questionnaires first). Beginning with participants who completed the dot probe first,
separate t-tests for repeated measures were conducted for each shame group
comparing attentional bias for 150 ms trials with performance for 500 ms trials, 150 ms
trials with 1,000 ms trials, and 500 ms trials with 1,000 ms trials. The same analyses
were then conducted for participants who completed the questionnaires first. For
participants who completed the dot probe first, none of the pairwise comparisons were
significant. For those who completed the questionnaires first, our findings showed that
duration made a difference for low shame participants. Specifically, low shame
participants displayed an attentional bias away from the emotional faces at the 500 ms
duration (attention avoidance; M = -8.42, SD = 23.03), which was significantly different
from an attentional bias toward emotional faces at the 1,000 ms duration (attention
vigilance; M = 6.59, SD = 21.05) (t(20) = -2.19, p = .04). There was a similar trend
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Figure 4a. Conventional Attention Bias scores: Dot Probe First
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Figure 4b. Conventional Attention Bias scores: Questionnaires First
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for a difference between the attention avoidance at 500 ms and attention vigilance at
150 ms (M = 5.82, SD = 25.86) (t(20) = 1.70, p = .11). There was no significant
difference between biases at the 150 ms and 1000 ms durations.
We also evaluated the simple main effect of group at each duration for each
order. We conducted three ANOVAs for each order to investigate the effect of group at
150 ms, 500 ms, and 1, 000 ms. Results for participants who completed the dot probe
first indicated a trending group main effect at the 500 ms stimulus exposure duration,
F(2, 57) = 2.74, p = .07. For completeness, the follow-up analyses for the 500 ms
duration using the LSD method indicated low shame individuals displayed an attentional
bias toward emotional faces (M = 9.56, SD = 15.63), which was significantly different
from the moderate shame individuals’ bias away from emotional faces (M = -4.08, SD =
21.27; p = .02). There were no group main effects at the 150 ms, F(2, 57) = 2.0, p = .15,
nor the 1,000 F(2, 57) < 1, p = .99) durations. Analyses for participants who completed
questionnaires first also demonstrated a trending group main effect at the 500 ms
stimulus exposure duration, F(2, 62) = 2.84, p = .07. However, follow-up analyses for the
500 ms duration using the LSD method indicated that when questionnaires were
administered first, low shame individuals displayed an attentional bias away emotional
faces (M = -8.42, SD = 23.03), which was significantly different from the bias towards
emotional faces among moderate shame individuals (M = 4.00, SD = 19.09; p = .04) and
low shame individuals’ avoidance was significantly different from high shame individuals’
vigilance towards emotional faces (M = 4.35, SD = 17.05; p = .04). Moderate and high
shame individuals were not significantly different (p = .95) at this duration and order.
Group main effects at neither the 150 ms (p = .72) nor the 1,000 ms (p = .22) durations
approached significance.
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Figure 5. Bias Scores by Group and Stimulus Valence in the AB Index

In addition, there was a trend towards significance for the affect X group
interaction, F(4, 238) = 2.04, p = .09 (see Figure 5 for AB scores by group and stimulus
valence). For completeness, we followed the trending affect X group interaction with
analyses of the effects of affect for each shame group. Repeated measures t-tests were
used to compare disgust faces with sad faces, disgust faces with happy faces, and sad
faces with happy faces separately for low, medium, and high shame groups. Results
indicated that there was a trend for high shame participants to exhibit attention vigilance
to disgust faces (M = 7.50, SD = 16.49) compared to sad faces (M = -.17, SD = 17.75),
t(41) = 2.02, p = .05. There was no significant difference between biases to sad and
happy stimuli (M = 2.37, SD = 14.7), t(41) = 0.70, p = .49, nor disgust stimuli and happy
stimuli, t(41) = 1.5, p = .13. There were no significant pairwise comparisons for the
moderate and low shame groups (all p-values > .12). We also evaluated the simple main
effect of group for each affect by conducting three one-way ANOVAs. There was a
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trending main effect for group for the disgust faces, F(2, 122) = 2.86, p = .06. Follow-up
tests using the LSD post hoc test revealed that attention vigilance in the low shame
group (M = 7.72, SD = 22.14) was significantly different than the slight attention
avoidance in the moderate shame group (M = -1.15, SD = 18.53; p = .04). Likewise, the
attention vigilance observed in the high shame group (M = 7.50, SD = 16.49; p = .04)
was significantly different than the slight attention avoidance in the moderate shame
group. Interestingly, there was no significant difference in biases to disgust faces
between the low and high shame group (p = .96). The simple main effect of shame
group was not significant for either sad, F(2, 122) < 1, p = .39, or happy trials,
F(2, 122) = 1.4, p = .25.
ANOVA results for the analysis of the FE index are summarized in Table 5. The
analysis indicated a significant main effect for shame group (F(2,119) = 3.65 , p = .02).
We utilized the LSD post hoc analysis to further investigate group differences. Results
indicated that low shame participants oriented to affective stimuli significantly faster
(facilitated engagement; M = 6.61, SE = 2.89) than high shame participants who showed
slightly slowed engagement (M = -2.77, SE = 2.90; p = .02). Similarly, facilitated
engagement scores for moderate shame (M = 7.09, SE = 2.97) were significantly
different than the slowed engagement scores for the high shame group (p = .02) (See
Figure 6).
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Table 5. ANOVA Summary of Facilitated Engagement Index
Source of Variance

F

df

p

Affect

0.26

(2,238)

.77

Duration

2.26

(2,238)

.11

Order

0.73

(1,119)

.40

Group

3.65

(2,119)

.02*

Affect X Duration

0.90

(4,476)

.50

Affect X Group

1.95

(4,238)

.10

Affect X Order

0.29

(2,238)

.75

Duration X Group

0.64

(4,238)

.64

Duration X Order

0.36

(2,238)

.70

Group X Order

0.83

(2,119)

.44

Affect X Duration X Group

1.04

(8, 476)

.41

Affect X Duration X Order

1.79

(4,476)

.13

Affect X Order X Group

0.14

(4,238)

.97

Duration X Order X Group

1.35

(4,238)

.25

Affect X Duration X Order X Group

0.99

(8,476)

.44

Note. * indicates significance at the .05 level.
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In addition, there was a trend toward a significant affect X group interaction, F(4,
238) = 1.95, p = .10 (see Figure 7 for FE scores by group and stimulus valence). We
used repeated measures t-tests to follow up this interaction, which revealed that high
shame participants were slower to engage with sad stimuli (M = -5.98, SD = 17.84)
compared to both disgust stimuli (M = -.57, SD = 21.77 ) (t(41) = 2.37, p = .02) and
happy stimuli (M = -1.13, SD = 18.37 ) (t(41) = 2.14, p = .04), and there was no
significant difference in FE scores between happy and disgust stimuli (t(41) = 0.18, p =
.86). For the moderate and low shame groups, there were no significant pairwise
comparisons (all p-values > .12). To further follow up this interaction, we also
investigated the simple main effect of shame group at each affect. The main effect for
group was significant with sad faces F(2,122) = 5.61, p = .005. The low shame group
showed facilitated engagement to the sad faces (M = 4.70, SD = 25.81), which was
significantly different from the slowed engagement to sad faces in the high shame group
(M = -6.0, SD = 17.84; p = .03) as indicated by LSD post hoc analyses.
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Figure 7. Bias Scores by Group and Stimulus Valence in the FE Index

The facilitated engagement to the sad faces among the moderate shame group
(M = 10.51, SD = 24.00) was also significantly different from the slowed engagement to
sad faces in the high shame group (p = .001). There also was a trend for an effect of
group with happy faces, F(2, 122) = 2.36. p = .10. We observed that low shame
participants displayed enhanced engagement for happy faces (M = 8.46, SD = 22.27)
compared to high shame participants' slightly slowed engagement (M =-1.13, SD =
18.37, p = .04). There were no significant differences in engagement to happy faces
when comparing moderate shame participants (M = 5.83, SD = 21.85) to either low
shame participants (p = .57) or high shame participants (p = .13). There was no effect of
group for disgust faces disgust faces, F(2, 122) = 1.28, p = .28.
ANOVA results for the DD index are presented in Table 6. The analysis
indicated a significant main effect for shame group F(2,119) = 4.44 , p = .01).

53

Table 6. ANOVA Summary of Difficulty Disengaging Index
Source of Variance

F

df

p

Affect

1.87

(2,238)

.16

Duration

1.45

(2,238)

.24

Order

0.20

(1,119)

.65

Group

4.44

(2,119)

.01*

Affect X Duration

0.32

(4,476)

.86

Affect X Group

0.59

(4, 238)

.67

Affect X Order

0.17

(2,238)

.85

Duration X Group

0.29

(4,238)

.89

Duration X Order

0.41

(2,238)

.67

Group X Order

1.07

(2,119)

.35

Affect X Duration X Group

0.70

(8, 476)

.69

Affect X Duration X Order

1.00

(4,476)

.41

Affect X Order X Group

1.08

(4,238)

.37

Duration X Order X Group

0.44

(4,238)

.78

Affect X Duration X Order X Group

1.24

(8,476)

.28

Note. * indicates significance at the .05 level.
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Follow-up tests utilizing the LSD method indicated that the high shame group took longer
to disengage attention from affective trials than neutral trials (difficulty disengaging;
M = 6.1, SE = 3.11) trials compared to the moderate shame group (eased
disengagement; M = -7.06, SE = 3.19; p = 0.004); the low shame group (M = -1.62, SE =
3.1) did not differ significantly from the moderate (p = .21) shame group. The high
shame group exhibited a trend towards having greater difficulty disengaging from
affective stimuli compared to the low shame group (p = .09) (See Figure 8). None of the
other main effects or interactions in our ANOVA were significant.
We also investigated participants’ change in affect over time. We conducted two
mixed-factorial ANOVAs to evaluate the effects of shame group and time for positive and
negative affect (see Table 7 and Table 8, respectively). In terms of positive affect, we
found a main effect of time F(2,240) = 53.4, p < .001). We conducted three repeated
measures t-tests as a follow-up. Results indicated a significant decrease in positive
affect from Time 1 (M = 27.2, SD = 7.5) to Time 2 (M = 23.5, SD = 8.0), t(122) = 6.94, p
< .001 (See Figure 9). There was a further significant decrease from Time 2 to Time 3
(M = 21.9, SD = 8.3), t(122) = 4.01, < .001. Accordingly, the overall decline from Time 1
to Time 3 was also significant, t(123) = 8.64, < .001.
In addition, the main effect of group was trending towards significance F(2,120) =
3.06, p = .051). Follow up analyses using LSD indicated significantly greater positive
affect in low shame participants (M = 26.44, SE = 1.11) compared to both moderate
shame participants (M = 23.01, SE = 1.12; p = .03) and high shame participants (M =
23.15, SE = 1.10; p = .04) (See Figure 10). There was no significant difference in
positive affect between moderate and high shame groups (p = .93) . Analyses yielded no
significant interaction between time and shame group, F(4, 240) = 1.09, p = .36).

55

8

Bias Score

6

4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
-8
Low

Moderate

High

Shame Group
Figure 8. Means of DD Scores by Group

Table 7. ANOVA Summary of Positive Affect
Source of Variance

F

df

p

Time

53.40

(2,240)

.000*

Group

3.06

(2,120)

.051

Time X Group

1.09

(4,240)

.36

Note. * indicates significance at the .05 level.

56

28

Positive PANAS Score

26

24
22
20
18
16
14
12
Time 1

Time 2
Assessment

Time 3

Figure 9. Change in Positive Affect in Participants Overall

28

Positive PANAS Score

26
24
22
20
18
16
14
12

10
Low

Moderate

High

Shame Group
Figure 10. Trend of Group Differences in Negative Affect
57

Table 8. ANOVA Summary of Negative Affect
Source of Variance

F

df

p

Time

11.43

(2,240)

.000*

Group

17.20

(2,120)

.000*

Time X Group

0.32

(4,240)

.87

Note. * indicates significance at the .05 level.
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In terms of negative affect, we found a main effect of time F(2,240) = 11.43,
p < .001). Our follow-up using three repeated measures t-tests indicated a significant
decrease in negative affect from Time 1 (M =14.23, SD = 4.4) to Time 2 (M = 13.24,
SD = 3.9) (t(122) = 3.71, p < .001), and an overall decline from Time 1 (M =14.21 ,
SD = 4.4) to Time 3 (M = 12.92, SD = 3.9) (t(123) = 4.19, p < .001) (See Figure 11).
There was no significant difference in negative affect from Time 2 to Time 3 (p = .24).
The main effect of group was also significant F(2,120) = 17.2, p < .001). Follow
up analyses using LSD indicated significantly greater negative affect in high shame
participants (M = 15.79, SE =.50) compared to both moderate shame participants
(M = 12.83, SE = .52; p < .001) and low shame participants (M = 11.72, SE =.51;
p <.001) (See Figure 12). There was no significant difference in negative affect between
low and moderate shame groups (p = .13). We found no significant interaction between
time and shame group F(4,240) = 0.32, p = .87.
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Discussion
Shameful affect is associated with a range of anxiety and depressive mood
disorders (Gilbert, 2000; Fergus et al., 2010; Kim, Thibodeau, & Jorgensen, 2011;
Carvalho, 2013). In addition, prior research has demonstrated biases in attention
processing among anxious and depressed participants. The current study sought to
investigate components of attention processing that may be influenced by shameful
affect. In order to evaluate attentional biases in shame, we compared dot probe
performance of individuals with low, moderate, and high levels of trait shame.
Additionally, we investigated the effect of the affective valence of test stimuli and time
course of such biases by exposing stimuli portraying disgust, sad, and happy faces at
short (150 ms), medium (500 ms), and long (1,000 ms) durations. The order of
administration of the dot probe and various study-related self-report questionnaires was
counterbalanced (i.e., dot probe task followed by questionnaires; questionnaires
followed by dot probe task) across participants.
Consistent with prior research on shame, we found at baseline that the high
shame group also had higher levels of guilt, depression, state and trait anxiety, social
anxiety, and stress. The high shame group, as defined by scores on the Experience of
Shame Scale (ESS) also had higher shame scores on the Test of Self Conscious Affect
(TOSCA), suggesting convergent validity of these measures. Although the high group
had higher guilt scores than both the low and moderate shame groups, the low and
moderate shame groups did not differ from one another. However, it should also be
noted that there were no differences among the three shame groups on pride as
measured by the TOSCA, suggesting that shame and pride may be unrelated constructs
despite broad perceptions they may reflect opposite ends of the same variable.
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Unexpectedly, we found evidence of an order effect in the context of a three-way
duration X shame group X order interaction when examining the conventional attention
bias index. When the questionnaires were administered first, we observed that the
stimulus exposure duration impacted individuals with low amounts of shame, whereas
duration had no effect for the other shame groups. Averaging reaction times across
affective trials, low shame participants showed a vigilant-avoidant-vigilant pattern, where
they demonstrated vigilance of emotional stimuli at short and long exposure durations
and avoidance at a mid-range exposure duration. The impact of the stimulus duration
was absent for individuals with moderate-high levels of shame. These findings are
contrary to our hypotheses, in which we predicted a vigilant-avoidant pattern of attention
biases to threatening stimuli in those experiencing high shame and avoidance of
threatening stimuli at all durations in those with low levels of shame. Notably, we found
no effect of duration when the dot probe was administered first. Thus, it is likely that the
questionnaires influenced the low shame group’s performance, perhaps by altering the
affective state of this group. It is possible that completing questionnaires first may induce
affect or increase affective awareness in the low shame group that does not otherwise
occur if the dot probe was completed first. In turn, this may influence where low shame
participants allocate their attention. In other words, completing the questionnaires may
have induced an emotional or cognitive state that then influenced how they performed
on the dot probe. Perhaps the dot probe first condition reflects participants’ performance
without this additional influence.
In addition to these findings, we observed trends for shame groups to differ at the
500 ms duration and that the direction of that effect differed for the two administration
orders. Specifically, when questionnaires were administered first, the low shame group
demonstrated avoidance of emotional faces and the moderate and high shame groups
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demonstrated emotion vigilance. Interestingly, when the dot probe was administered
first, this pattern was partially reversed in that the low shame group exhibited vigilance to
emotional faces and the moderate shame group exhibited slight avoidance of emotional
faces at the mid-range duration. It seems that the low shame group is driving the
differences in attentional bias patterns across each of the orders of administration,
although the reason that order made a difference for the conventional attention bias is
not clear. It is possible that the dot probe is vulnerable to order effects, or this could be
reflective of a Type I error. Moreover, it is unclear why these differences appeared only
at the mid-range duration. Future research should be sensitive to the possibility of order
effects in regards to the dot probe.and should administer the dot probe first in order to
minimize any effects that prior testing, that is not of specific theoretical interest, may
have on dot probe performance. Additionally, future studies utilizing the dot probe
paradigm should continue to assess the time course of biases by exposing stimuli at
multiple durations. It may be that the 500 ms stimulus exposure duration is important in
capturing between-group differences for shame.
We extended these findings by exploring the constructs of facilitated engagement
(faster orienting toward) and difficulty disengaging (slowed shifting of attention away).
Based on our prediction of observing a bias toward threat, we expected to observe
facilitated engagement to disgust stimuli in high shame individuals. However, our results
showed that individuals who reported high levels of shame were slower to engage in all
affective stimuli compared to individuals with low or moderate levels of shame. As a
possible explanation for this unexpected finding, we note that shame is marked by fear
of negative social evaluation (Clark, 2005; Leary, 2004). Accordingly, slowed
engagement in response to the emotional stimuli used in this study may be reflective of
avoidance of social stimuli in particular, regardless of emotional valence. Future
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research could investigate whether non-social, emotional stimuli influence attention
allocation differently than social, emotional stimuli.
Further extending our investigation of attention biases, we expected that high
shame individuals would demonstrate difficulty disengaging from threatening stimuli.
This prediction was partially supported in that high shame individuals experienced more
difficulty disengaging from all affective stimuli compared to individuals with moderate
shame, and this pattern was trending in regards to individuals with high compared to low
shame. Thus, individuals with high levels of shame exhibited slowed engagement to- but
delayed disengagement from all affective stimuli. The results from the facilitated
engagement and difficulty disengaging indices indicate highly shame individuals have a
delay in attending to affective stimuli, similar to attention avoidance, but once information
is attended to there may be a delay in shifting attention and/or interference in making a
response (Matlow, Gard, and Berg, 2012).
Disengagement difficulties have been found in previous studies on anxiety (Fox,
Russo, Dutton, 2002; Koster er al., 2004; Klumpp and Amir, 2009; Matlow, Gard, and
Berg, 2012). Particularly surprising was our observation that delayed disengagement
was seen for both positively and negatively valenced stimuli. We expected that
individuals experiencing high levels of shame would be particularly concerned with
shame-inducing stimuli (i.e. disgust faces). However, high shame individuals
demonstrated increased dwell-time to all stimuli regardless of valence. Researchers
suggest that deficiencies in disengaging are particularly problematic in anxiety because
prolonged attention to threatening cues may prolong distressful states and inhibit
attention allocation to positive stimuli and alternate coping strategies (Koster et al.,
2004). Perhaps those with high levels of shame experience prolonged attention to all
affective stimuli due to all affective stimuli being perceived as threatening. Other
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possibilities are that dwelling on emotional faces regardless of valence may be reflective
of high shame individuals having difficulty interpreting facial expressions or having a
biased interpretation of facial expressions as threatening regardless of the affect
displayed. Future research should investigate interpretation biases in those with varying
levels of shame.
These observed group differences for the facilitated engagement and difficulty
disengaging indices were consistent across affective stimuli and duration of stimulus
exposure, contrary to our predictions. Research on domain-specificity (i.e., bias only to
emotionally-relevant stimuli) has yielded mixed results. For example, Mogg et al., (1995)
observed attentional biases to anxiety-relevant threatening words (“attack”, “hostile”) and
depression-relevant words (“sad”, worthless”) in a GAD sample. Schofield, Inhoff, and
Coles (2013) found no differences in attention biases between angry, afraid, and happy
faces in a socially anxious sample. A potential explanation for our findings is that all
affective information may be threatening to high shame individuals. In their research on
social anxiety, Weeks, Heimberg, and Rodebaugh (2008) found that in addition to fear of
negative evaluation, fear of positive public evaluation was also related to social anxiety,
suggesting that fear of evaluation in general may increase distress in those with social
anxiety. Perhaps those who experience high levels of shame experience similar distress
associated with both negatively and positively valenced, social stimuli. Future research
on shame should continue to evaluate the effect of both negative and positive valenced
stimuli as well as both social and non-social stimuli on attention allocation
Although not significant, we observed some trends of domain-specificity. There
was a trending effect for highly ashamed individuals to demonstrate attention vigilance to
disgust faces and to avoid sad faces as measured by the conventional attention bias
index. Interestingly, there was no difference in bias scores between disgust and happy
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faces. Furthermore, there was a trending effect for the high shame group to exhibit
disgust vigilance compared to the moderate shame group’s slight disgust avoidance.
This is partly consistent with our hypothesis that attention biases would be specific to
disgust stimuli and not sad stimuli; however, it is not clear why attention biases to
disgust were comparable to attention biases to happy stimuli nor why disgust vigilance
was comparable between low and high shame groups. Additionally, there was generally
slowed engagement to affective stimuli for high shame individuals and engagement was
particularly slow to sad faces compared to either disgust or happy faces. We also
observed a trending effect of shame group for sad faces and happy faces. While the
high shame group exhibited slowed engagement to sad faces, the low and moderate
shame groups exhibited facilitated engagement to sad faces. Likewise, while the high
shame group exhibited slightly slowed engagement to happy faces, the low and
moderate shame groups exhibited facilitated engagement to happy faces. The trends for
the conventional attention bias index and facilitated engagement index converge to
suggest that high shame individuals demonstrate increased vigilance to disgust faces
compared to sad, and high shame individuals are not as slow to engage disgust faces as
they are to engage sad and happy faces. This pattern provides some evidence of
disgust vigilance for high shame individuals, partially consistent with our hypotheses.
Alternatively, the significantly slower engagement with sad stimuli may indicate that
individuals with high shame perceive sad stimuli as more threatening than other affect.
Future studies should investigate the perception of various affect as threatening among
highly ashamed individuals.
Our data using the enhanced engagement and difficulty disengaging indices
provided valuable information that would have been absent if we relied solely on the
conventional attention bias scoring method. Therefore, future research should include
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neutral-neutral trials for analyzing indices of engagement and disengagement, which
detects more specific components of visual attention than the conventional attention bias
index. Moreover, our inclusion of multiple affective faces provided us valuable
information into domain-specificity. If we had relied solely on disgust stimuli, we may
have inferred our biases were particular to shame-inducing, disgust faces. It follows that
future studies should include multiple affective stimuli.
Our shame groups reported different levels of negative affect and a trend
towards differences for positive affect. High shame participants reported greater
negative affect than those in the low and moderate shame groups, whereas the latter
two groups did not differ. In addition, low shame participants reported greater positive
than either moderate or high shame participants, whereas there was no difference
between the latter two groups.
We predicted a decline in positive affect and an increase in negative affect over the
course of the lab visit for all participants. Partially consistent with this hypothesis, we
observed a decline in positive affect, but we also observed a decline in negative affect
throughout the course of the visit. For positive affect there were significant declines
across all three time points, whereas for negative affect there was a significant decline
from baseline to midway through the dot probe task, with no further change to the end of
the task. Thus, contrary to expectations, we did not induce negative affect. In fact, we
observed a decline in all affect over the course of the lab visit. It is possible that if we
had included a mood induction manipulation in our study, and specifically shame
induction, we may have observed different results. Perhaps future studies could
investigate whether trait and state shame make different contributions to attention
biases.
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There are several limitations within our study that should be noted. First, our high
shame group also reported higher levels of depression and anxiety. This presents
interpretive limitations in that our results may be driven by elevations of affect other than,
or in addition to, shame. We could have used one or more measures of alternate affects
as covariates, which may have allowed us to determine whether our results were
specific to shame, or a reflection of attention biases in shame, anxiety, and/or
depression. However, covarying anxiety and depression also may have attenuated any
effects because shame is inherently confounded with depression and anxiety.
Accordingly, removing depression and anxiety symptoms fundamentally shifts the
phenomenon to something other than shame.
Second, our dot probe task was quite lengthy, and our error rates were higher
than other error rates in the literature. However, the high error rates were driven by
relatively few participants (n = 4 with error rates over 25%). Moreover, all errors were
deleted from our analyses and we believed the benefit of counterbalancing several
variables, which lengthened our task, outweighed the consequences. Third,, our dot
probe provided three stimulus exposure durations, but did not include methods to
measure biases at durations shorter than 150 ms, or at durations in between 150 ms
and 500 ms and 500 ms to 1,000 ms, such as by utilizing eye tracking software. Fourth,
our sample was nonclinical, making it possible that our participants may not be
experiencing shame at levels as severe as a clinical population. For example, our results
may have been different had we intentionally recruited individuals diagnosed with PTSD,
secondary to childhood sexual assault. Fifth, we examined trait shame, and may have
witnessed different patterns of biases had we evaluated individuals with varying levels of
state shame, such as by utilizing mood induction methods. Sixth, we employed a post
hoc grouping strategy due to insufficient recruitment of our initial low shame group. It is
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possible that our shame screener contributed to low shame individuals self-selecting
themselves out of the study. Lastly, our evidence for domain-specificity is relatively weak
because we included interpretation of trends in our data.
Measurement of shame has relied on assessing cognitions, typically regarding
fear of negative evaluation from others and the propensity to negatively evaluate
oneself. Examining information processing mechanisms in shame allows researchers to
further understand automatic processing that occurs in shameful affect. Thus, future
research should continue to focus on components of information processing in shame.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Demographics
Age ____
Race:_____
1 – Asian or Pacific Islander
2 – Black/African American
3 – Native American
4 – White
5 –Other (please specify): ____________________
99 – I do not wish to disclose this

Ethnicity: Are you Hispanic? _____
1 – Yes
2 – No
99 – I do not wish to disclose this

Relationship status:_____
1-Single, not dating
2-In a committed relationship
3-Married
4-Divorced/Separated
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Appendix B: ESS
ESS
Everybody at times can feel embarrassed, self-conscious, or ashamed. These questions
are about such feelings if they have occurred at any time in the past year. There are no 'right' or
'wrong' answers. Please indicate the response which applies to you with a tick.
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Appendix C: TOSCA-3

TOSCA-3
Below are situations that people are likely to encounter in day-to-day life,
followed by several common reactions to those situations.
As you read each scenario, try to imagine yourself in that situation. Then
indicate how likely you would be to react in each of the ways described. We ask you to
rate all responses because people may feel or react more than one way to the same
situation, or they may react different ways at different times.
For example:
You wake up early one Saturday morning. It is cold and rainy outside.
a) You would telephone a friend to catch up
1--2--3--4--5
on news.
not likely
very likely
b) You would take the extra time to read the
1--2--3--4--5
paper.
not likely
very likely
c) You would feel disappointed that it’s raining.
1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely
d) You would wonder why you woke up so early. 1 - - 2 - - 3 - - 4 - - 5
not likely
very likely

In the above example, I’ve rated all of the answers by circling a number. I circled
a “1” for answer (a) because I wouldn’t want to wake up a friend very early on a
Saturday morning—so it’s not at all likely that I would do that. I circled a “5” for answer
(b) because I almost always read the paper if I have time in the morning (very likely). I
circled a “3” for answer (c) because for me it’s about half and half. Sometimes I would
be disappointed about the rain and sometimes I wouldn’t—it would depend on what I
had planned. And I circled a “4” for answer (d) because I would probably wonder why I
had awakened so early.
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Please do not skip any items—rate all responses.
1. You make plans to meet a friend for lunch. At 5 o’clock, you realize you stood your
friend up.
a) You would think: “I’m inconsiderate.”
b) You would think: “Well, my friend
will understand.”

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely
1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

c) You’d think you should make it up to your
friend as soon as possible.

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

d) You would think: “My boss distracted me
just before lunch.”

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

2. You break something at work and then hide it.
a) You would think: “This is making me
anxious. I need to either fix it or get
someone else to.”
b) You would think about quitting.
c) You would think: “A lot of things aren’t
made very well these days.”
d) You would think: “It was only an accident.”
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1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely
1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely
1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely
1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

3. You are out with friends one evening, and you’re feeling especially witty and
attractive. Your best friend’s spouse seems to particularly enjoy your company.
a) You would think: “I should have been
aware of what my best friend was feeling.”

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

b) You would feel happy with your
appearance and personality.

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

c) You would feel pleased to have made
such a good impression.

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

d) You would think your best friend should
pay attention to his/her spouse.
e) You would probably avoid eye contact
for a long time.

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely
1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

4. At work, you wait until the last minute to plan a project, and it turns out badly.
a) You would feel incompetent.
b) You would think: “There are never enough
hours in the day.”
c) You would feel: “I deserve to be
reprimanded for mismanaging the
project.”
d) You would think: “What’s done is done.”
pay attention to his/her spouse.
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1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely
1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely
1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely
1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

5. You make a mistake at work and find out a coworker is blamed for the error.
a) You would think the company did not like
the coworker.

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

b) You would think: “Life is not fair.”
c) You would keep quiet and avoid the
coworker.

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely
1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

d) You would feel unhappy and eager to
correct the situation.

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

6. For several days you put off making a difficult phone call. At the last minute you
make the call and are able to manipulate the conversation so that all goes well.
a) You would think: “I guess I’m more
persuasive than I thought.”

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

b) You would regret that you put it off.

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely
1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely
1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely
1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

c) You would feel like a coward.
d) You would think: “I did a good job.”
e) You would think you shouldn’t have to
make calls you feel pressured into.
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7. While playing around, you throw a ball and it hits your friend in the face.
a) You would feel inadequate that you can’t
even throw a ball.

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

b) You would think maybe your friend needs
more practice at catching.

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

c) You would think: “It was just an accident.”

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely
1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

d) You would apologize and make sure your
friend feels better.

8. You have recently moved away from your family, and everyone has been very
helpful. A few times you needed to borrow money, but you paid it back as soon as
you could.
a) You would feel immature.
b) You would think: “I sure ran into some
bad luck.”

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely
1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

c) You would return the favor as quickly
as you could.

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

d) You would think: “I am a trustworthy
person.”
e) You would be proud that you repaid
your debts.

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely
1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely
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9. You are driving down the road, and you hit a small animal.
a) You would think the animal shouldn’t
have been on the road.

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

b) You would think: “I’m terrible.”

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely
1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely
1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

c) You would feel: “Well, it was an accident.”
d) You’d feel bad you hadn’t been more alert
driving down the road.

10. You walk out of an exam thinking you did extremely well. Then you find out you
did poorly.
a) You would think: “Well, it’s just a test.”
b) You would think: “The instructor doesn’t
like me.”

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely
1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

c) You would think: “I should have
studied harder.”

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

d) You would feel stupid.

1--2--3--4--5
not likely

likely
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very

11. You and a group of coworkers worked very hard on a project. Your boss singles
you out for a bonus because the project was such a success.
a) You would feel the boss is rather
short-sighted.

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

b) You would feel alone and apart from
your colleagues.

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

c) You would feel your hard work had
paid off.

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

d) You could feel competent and proud
of yourself.
e) You would feel you should not accept it.

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely
1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

12. While out with a group of friends, you make fun of a friend who’s not there.
a) You would think: “It was all in fun;
it’s harmless.”

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

b) You would feel small … like a rat.

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely
1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

c) You would think that perhaps that friend
should have been there to defend
him/herself.
d) You would apologize and talk about that
person’s good points.
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1--2--3--4--5
not likely

very likely

13. You make a big mistake on an important project at work. People were depending
on you, and your boss criticizes you.
a) You would think your boss should have
been more clear about what was
expected of you.

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

b) You would feel like you wanted to hide

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely
1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

c) You would think: “I should have recognized
the problem and done a better job.”
d) You would think: “Well, nobody’s perfect.”

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

14. You volunteer to help with the local Special Olympics for handicapped children. It
turns out to be frustrating and time-consuming work. You think seriously about
quitting, but then you see how happy the kids are.
a) You would feel selfish, and you’d think you
are basically lazy.

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

b) You would feel you were forced into doing
something you did not want to do.

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

c) You would think: “I should be more
concerned about people who are less
fortunate.”

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

d) You would feel great that you had helped
others.
e) You would feel very satisfied with yourself.

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely
1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely
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15. You are taking care of your friend’s dog while your friend is on vacation, and th
dog runs away.
a) You would think: “I am irresponsible
and incompetent.”

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

b) You would think your friend must not take
very good care of the dog or it wouldn’t
have run away.

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

c) You would vow to be more careful next time.

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely
1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

d) You would think your friend could just get
a new dog.

16. You attend your coworker’s housewarming party and you spill red wine on a new
cream-colored carpet, but you think no one notices.
a) You think your coworker should have
expected some accidents at suck a
big party.

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

b) You would stay late to help clean up the
stain after the party.

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

c) You would wish you were anywhere
but at the party.

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely

d) You would wonder why your coworker
chose to serve red wine with the new
light carpet.

1--2--3--4--5
not likely
very likely
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Appendix D: DASS-21

DASS 21
Please read each statement and circle a number 0, 1, 2 or 3 which indicates how much the
statement
applied to you over the past week. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too
much time
on any statement.
The rating scale is as follows:
0 Did not apply to me at all
1 Applied to me to some degree, or some of the time
2 Applied to me to a considerable degree, or a good part of time
3 Applied to me very much, or most of the time
1. I found it hard to wind down
0

1

2

3

2. I was aware of dryness of my mouth
0

1

2

3

3. I couldn't seem to experience any positive feeling at all
0

1

2

3

4. I experienced breathing difficulty (e.g., excessively rapid breathing, breathlessness in the
absence of physical exertion)
0

1

2

3

5. I found it difficult to work up the initiative to do things
0

1

2

3

6. I tended to over-react to situations
0

1

2

3

7. I experienced trembling (e.g., in the hands)
0

1

2

3

8. I felt that I was using a lot of nervous energy
0

1

2

3
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9. I was worried about situations in which I might panic and make a fool of myself
0

1

2

3

10. I felt that I had nothing to look forward to
0

1

2

3

11. I found myself getting agitated
0

1

2

3

12. I found it difficult to relax
0

1

2

3

13. I felt down-hearted and blue
0

1

2

3

14. I was intolerant of anything that kept me from getting on with what I was doing
0

1

2

3

15. I felt I was close to panic
0

1

2

3

16. I was unable to become enthusiastic about anything
0

1

2

3

17. I felt I wasn't worth much as a person
0

1

2

3

18. I felt that I was rather touchy
0

1

2

3

19. I was aware of the action of my heart in the absence of physical exertion (e.g., sense of heart
rate increase, heart missing a beat)
0

1

2

3

20. I felt scared without any good reason
0

1

2

3

21. I felt that life was meaningless
0

1

2

3
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Appendix E: STAI
SELF-EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE

STAI Form Y-1
Please provide the following information:
Name
Age

Date
Gender (Circle) M

F

S
T

Directions:
A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given
below. Read each statement and then circle the appropriate number to the right of the
statement to indicate how you feel right now, that is, at this moment. There are no right
or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement but give the
answer which seems to describe your present feelings best.

1.

I feel calm……………………………………………………………………………………….……..……………. 1

2

3

4

2.

I feel secure………………………………………………………………………………………………….………. 1

2

3

4

3.

I feel tense…………………………………………………………………………………………………….……… 1

2

3

4

4.

I feel strained.……………………………………………………………………..…………………………….… 1

2

3

4

5.

I feel at ease……………………………………………………………………………..……………………….… 1

2

3

4

6.

I feel upset……………………………………………………………………………………..………………….… 1

2

3

4

7.

I am presently worrying over possible misfortunes……………………………..…………….… 1

2

3

4

8.

I feel satisfied.…………………………………………………………………………………………..……….… 1

2

3

4

9.

I feel frightened.…………………………………………………………………………………………..…….… 1

2

3

4

10. I feel comfortable……………………………………………………………………………………………...… 1

2

3

4

11. I feel self-confident……………………………………………………………………………………….……. 1

2

3

4

12. I feel nervous.……………………………………………………………………………………………….……… 1

2

3

4

13. I feel jittery..……………………………..……………………………………………………………………….… 1

2

3

4

14. I feel indecisive.……………………………..………………………………………………………………….… 1

2

3

4

15. I feel relaxed..……………………………………..…………………………………………………………….… 1

2

3

4

16. I feel content..…………………………………………..……………………………………………………….… 1

2

3

4

17. I feel worried..………………………………………………..………………………………………………….… 1

2

3

4

18. I feel confused……………………………………………………..…………………………………………….… 1

2

3

4

19. I feel steady.……………………………………………………………..……………………………………….… 1

2

3

4

20. I feel pleasant.………………………………………………………………..………………………………….… 1

2

3

4
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SELF-EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE
STAI Form Y-2
Name

Date
DIRECTIONS

A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves
are given below. Read each statement and then circle the appropriate
number to the right of the statement to indicate how you generally feel.
21. I feel pleasant.………………………………………………………………..…………………………………. 1

2

3

4

22. I feel nervous and restless….………………………………………..………………………………...…… 1

2

3

4

23. I feel satisfied with myself……………………………………………..………………………………….… 1

2

3

4

24. I wish I could be as happy as others seem to be……………..………………………………….… 1

2

3

4

25. I feel like a failure…………………………………………………………..………………………………….… 1

2

3

4

26. I feel rested….………………………………………………………………..………………………………….… 1

2

3

4

27. I am “calm, cool, and collected”……………………………………..………………………………….… 1

2

3

4

28. I feel that difficulties are piling up so that I cannot overcome them………….……….… 1

2

3

4

29. I worry too much over something that really doesn’t matter…………………………….… 1

2

3

4

30. I am happy…...………………………………………………………………..………………………………….… 1

2

3

4

31. I have disturbing thoughts……………………………………………..………………………………….… 1

2

3

4

32. I lack self-confidence……………………………………………………..………………………………….… 1

2

3

4

33. I feel secure….………………………………………………………………..………………………………….… 1

2

3

4

34. I make decisions easily…………………………………………………..………………………………….… 1

2

3

4

35. I feel inadequate.…………………………………………………………..………………………………….… 1

2

3

4

36. I am content...………………………………………………………………..………………………………….… 1

2

3

4

37. Some unimportant thought runs through my mind and bothers me………………….… 1

2

3

4

38. I take disappointments so keenly that I can’t put them out of my mind………………… 1

2

3

4

39. I am a steady person.……………………………………………………..………………………………….… 1

2

3

4

40. I get in a state of tension or turmoil as I think over my recent concerns and interests … 1

2

3

4
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Appendix F: SPIN
Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN)
Please read each statement and select a number 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 which indicates how much the

statement applied to you over the past week.
0

= Not at all 1 = A little bit 2 = Somewhat 3 = Very much 4 = Extremely

1. I am afraid of people in authority _____
2. I am bothered by blushing in front of people _____
3. Parties and social events scare me _____
4. I avoid talking to people I don’t know _____
5. Being criticized scares me a lot _____
6. I avoid doing things or speaking to people for fear of embarrassment _____
7. Sweating in front of people causes me distress _____
8. I avoid going to parties _____
9. I avoid activities in which I am the center of attention _____
10. Talking to strangers scares me _____
11. I avoid giving speeches _____
12. I would do anything to avoid being criticized _____
13. Heart palpitations bother me when I am around people _____
14. I am afraid of doing things when people might be watching _____
15. Being embarrassed or looking stupid are my worst fears _____
16. I avoid speaking to anyone in authority _____
17. Trembling or shaking in front of others is distressing to me _____
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Appendix G: PANAS

PANAS

This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions.
Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to the word.
Indicate to what extent you feel this way RIGHT NOW.

1

2

3

4

5

slightly

a little

moderately

quite a bit

extreme

or
not at all

______

interested

______

irritable

______

distressed

______

alert

______

excited

______

ashamed

______

upset

______

inspired

______

strong

______

nervous

______

guilty

______

determined

______

scared

______

attentive

______

hostile

______

jittery

______

enthusiastic

______

active

______

proud

______

afraid
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